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Abstract: 
 
The thesis seeks to compare the protection of minority shareholders during delisting in 
Germany and in the UK. Delisting refers to a publicly traded company leaving the stock 
market. In order to compare the protection afforded by the relevant legislator the thesis first 
seeks to give an overview of the interests touched upon by delisting, finding the main risk for 
minority shareholders is unlike often assumed not a loss of value but the loss of the share’s 
tradability. The thesis then compares the approach taken towards the problem and the 
instruments utilized by both legislators. Here the thesis finds that the German law represents a 
stricter and inflexible solution, while the British law grants the parties far reaching freedom. 
The thesis finds that German law in theory offers a higher level of protection. The thesis then 
considers the different shareholder structure in the UK, concluding that in practice the 
difference in protection is not as stark as often assumed. As some gaps remain, and since due 
to their financial interests the freedom offered by British law is of little benefit to minority 
shareholders, the thesis concludes that regarding the protection of minority shareholders the 
German law is preferable. 
 
Summary (for the purpose of later publications): 
 
This thesis seeks to compare the protection awarded to minority shareholders during delisting 
in Germany and in the UK. The thesis does not consider involuntary delistings, downlistings, 
the delistings of stocks traded outside of the premium segment of regulated markets or 
delistings in relation with take-overs or mergers. 
 
The thesis first seeks to establish the reasons and risks of delisting and with that the main 
interests of the parties involved. The thesis finds that the main reason for undertaking a 
delisting from the point of view of the issuer are the significant expenditures related to 
maintaining the delisting, notably stemming from duties to report and disclose information. 
For the majority shareholder, as he bears the brunt of these costs while not benefiting from the 
listing as much as minority shareholders, these motives are applicable as well. Additionally, 
for him the possibility to strengthen his control of the company and a possible undervaluation 
of the stocks on the market compared to their real value may also be relevant motives. 
 
From the point of view of the minority shareholder the thesis finds that the risks will by far 
outweigh any benefits. With the indications for a loss of value due to the announcement of the 
delisting are less clear the main concern here will be the loss of the main trading platform. 
This loss directly impacts the ability of minority shareholders to reach their primary goal, to 
generate a profit through their investment. 
 
Hence the thesis concludes that delistings represent a conflict of interests between the issuer 
and the majority shareholder and the minority shareholder on the other side. 
 
The thesis then considers the question whether delistings may have been harmonized under 
European Union Law or whether any specific requirements or boundaries to the protection of 
minority shareholders could result from European Union Law. Here the thesis finds that the 
question to what degree minority shareholders can and must be protected has not been 
regulated by the European Union and remains therefore for the individual national legislator 
to decide. 
 
Afterwards the thesis details and analyses the instruments used by German and British 
legislators respectively. Here the thesis finds that the buy-out offer, as implemented by the 
 German legislator, offers a fitting remedy for minority shareholders, as it perfectly 
accommodates the economic nature of their interests. Yet from the point of view of the issuer 
and the majority shareholder it causes significant costs and might not always be feasible, 
especially when the company is threatened by bankruptcy. 
 
With regards to the British law the thesis finds that the requirement of the general-meetings 
approval chosen by the British legislator to protect minority shareholders focuses more on 
minority shareholders’ membership rights and only offers protection for his economic 
interests as a reflex. Additionally, the thesis finds that there are some indications that minority 
shareholders are less likely to participate in general meetings, which further draws into 
question the effectiveness of the British approach. Notably in some constellations a significant 
number of minority shareholders might be cast aside and left unable to influence the decision-
making process. 
 
Lastly the thesis compares the instruments used with regards to the protection they offer 
minority shareholders and to the burden they represent for the company and the majority 
shareholder, while considering the previous findings. 
 
Here the thesis finds that while the British approach does offer the parties more freedom and 
therefore is better able to adapt to the individual circumstances, as minority shareholders 
usually pursue the single and uniform goal to generate a profit from their investment these 
advantages will regularly be of little interest to them. Contrary, for the German approach the 
thesis finds that while it lacks the flexibility and adaptability of the British approach it avoids 
the gaps in the protection that plague the British approach. As it offers a higher and notably 
steady degree of protection the thesis concludes that under the aspect of protecting minority 
shareholders it is preferable. The costs it imparts on the issuer and the majority shareholder do 
not change this outcome, as they are justified. 
 
Additionally, besides these theoretical legal arguments the thesis considers the factual 
situation on each market, i.e. the average composition of shareholders of listed firms. In this 
regard the thesis finds that a significantly higher number of free-floating shares exist in 
British companies. Taking this result into account the thesis concludes that the gaps in the 
protection offered to minority shareholders by the British law are somewhat less pressing 
considering the average composition of shareholders. 
 
Furthermore, the thesis finds that there is a lack of an exception from the buy-out offer in 
German law for companies facing bankruptcy, which is especially troubling given the high 
costs and low flexibility that characterize the German law from the issuers and the majority 
shareholder’s point of view. 
 
Considering these findings, the thesis concludes that, even when the factual circumstance’s 
and their divergence between Germany and the UK are considered, situations where the 
British approach awards only insufficient protection remain, although less likely, still 
possible. Therefore. the thesis concludes, that under the aspect of minority shareholders’ 
protection the German solution still presents itself as preferable. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
This thesis aims to compare the protection awarded to minority shareholders during 
delisting in Germany and in the UK. To do so the thesis will seek to answer the question 
which instruments each legislator has chosen to protect minority shareholders during 
delisting, how he has balanced the interests of the involved parties in choosing said 
instruments, and lastly, how these instruments compare regarding the protection they 
award minority shareholders, especially considering the restrictions they impose on the 
majority shareholder. 
Subject matter: 
Delisting refers to the process of a company listed on a stock market leaving said 
market. This leads to significant changes in both legal and economic terms, which can 
severely impact the interests of minority shareholders, among other consequences 
depriving them of their main trading platform. From the issuers and its majority 
shareholder’s perspective there may be valid reasons for a delisting, such as the 
significant costs that are associated with listing. As a result delisting represents a 
conflict of interests between the minority shareholders and the majority shareholder and 
the company. Thus, when regulating delistings legislators are faced with the task to 
balance the conflicting interests, namely to allow the company and the majority 
shareholder to delist as freely as possible while ensuring that the interests of minority 
shareholders are protected during this process. 
Significance:  
Between 2009 and 2019 in Germany alone 297 delistings were observed.
1
 Globally 
delistings are becoming more frequent,
2
 and due to the economic slowdown after the 
COVID-outbreak numbers may increase further as companies are forced to reduce 
costs. 
 
As delisting constitutes the couterpart to the Initial Public Offering and entails grave 
consequences for minority shareholders it forms an important part of any capital market 
law.  The protection afforded to minority sharholders during this process is not only part 
of a complicated system of connected and conflicting interests, it has also been the 
subject of much discussion and dispute, with numerous contrary solutions formulated 
on how to resolve this conflict of interests. Additionally, in recent years, namely after 
the global financial crisis in 2008, there has been an increased focus on consumer 
protection, which at times correlates to the protection of minority shareholders.  
 
As the two largest stock markets in Europe, the Frankfurter Börse (Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange) and the London Stock Exchange, are domiciled in Germany and the UK 
respectively, these two jurisdictions are especially relevant. Nonetheless, so far only a 
                                                 
1
 D. Fockenbrock „Der Rückzug von der Börse ist ein gefährlicher Trend“ (The retreat from the stock market is a 
dangerous trend) Available at https://www.handelsblatt.com/meinung/kommentare/kommentar-der-rueckzug-
von-der-boerse-ist-ein-gefaehrlicher-trend/24526692.html Accessed June 10
th
 2020. 
2
 Ibid. 
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very small number of academic works exist that compare the two, and even fewer have 
taken into account the significant changes that German law underwent in recent years. 
 
Therefore the protection of minority shareholders during delisting deserves to be 
examined in detail. 
Delimitations:  
While delistings may take place with or against the will of the issuer only in the case of 
the former, also referred to as going-private, a conflict of interest necessarily exists, 
creating the need for the protection of minority shareholders. Therefore, involuntary 
delistings are not considered in this thesis.  
 
Equally downlisting, i.e. when an issuer chooses not to leave the stock market entirely 
but instead seeks to transfer his listing to another market segment, faces different 
challenges and is much more depended on the available segments, hampering 
comparability. As a result, downlistings shall not be considered either.  
 
For the same reason this thesis will limit its comparison to the delisting of stocks listed 
in the premium segment of a regulated market in the sense of Art. 4 para. 21 directive 
2014/65/EU.
3
 
 
Likewise, delistings related to take-overs or mergers are subject to different 
circumstances and differ in terms of the involved interests. For that reason, delistings 
related to take-overs or mergers shall not be considered in this thesis either. 
Methodological issues: 
As the thesis takes a comparative approach the main challenge lays in identifying the 
factors relevant for the comparison. This is greatly complicated by the lack of sources 
for the British law. Another challenge lays in identifying and correctly assessing the 
implications of certain economic and factual circumstances that render some aspects 
incomparable, namely the different structure of shareholders.  
Structure: 
The thesis in its first chapter seeks to establish the reasons and risks of delisting, and 
with that the main interests of the parties involved. 
 
The second chapter seeks to consider the question whether delistings may have been 
harmonized under European Union Law, or whether any specific requirements or 
boundaries to the protection of minority shareholders could result from European Union 
Law.  
 
                                                 
3
 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial 
instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (recast), in the following: MIFID II 
directive. 
 
Note: All legislative acts and treaties referenced in the following refer, unless stated otherwise, to the version in 
force as of the 10
th
 of June 2020. 
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In chapter three and four the instruments used by German and British legislators 
respectively are detailed and analysed. 
 
Lastly in chapter five the instruments used are compared with regards to the protection 
they offer minority shareholders and to the burden they represent for the company and 
the majority shareholder.  
1 CHAPTER ONE: REASONS FOR AND RISKS OF DELISTING  
To compare the protection afforded to minority shareholders and the restrictions 
correspondingly put on majority shareholders and companies it is first necessary to 
establish the interests of these parties during delisting. 
 
Delisting constitutes a major shift both in economic as well as in legal terms. 
Just like an Initial Public Offering, which marks an important step in a company’s 
development, delisting represents a crucial moment for a company.
4
 And just like the 
initial listing it carries distinct benefits and disadvantages, which affect the interests of 
the company itself and its shareholders. 
 
As some reap benefits while others only bear the disadvantages, delisting could also be 
characterized as a conflict between the interest of the parties involved. 
 
In theory this conflict of interest takes place between the company’s interest of leaving 
the regulated stock market at its own discretion and the shareholders’ interests of being 
able to sell their shares quickly and for an adequate price.
5
 Yet factually this conflict of 
interests takes place between the company as well as the majority shareholders on one 
side and the minority shareholders on the other side.
6
 
1.1 Reasons: 
As delisting eliminates the disadvantages the listing brings with it the decision to 
undertake such a transaction may serve legitimate interests and may not only be 
economically viable but even necessary.  
1.1.1 For the company: 
In general, a company will decide to delist if the benefits of the continued listing are 
outweighed by the costs of said listing.
7
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
4
 Phillip Maume, “The Parting of the Ways: Delisting Under German and UK Law” European Business 
Organization Law Review (2015), p. 260. 
5
 Krug, Kirsten, Der Rückzug von der Börse -Widerstreitende Interessen von Groß- und Minderheitsaktionären 
beim Delisting (The retreat from the stock market – Conflicting interests of minority and majority shareholders 
during delisting) (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2019), p. 87. 
6
Ibid. 
7
 Krug, Der Rückzug von der Börse, p. 96; Martinez, Isabell and Serve, Stephanie and Djama, Constant “Reasons 
for delisting and consequences: A literature review and research agenda”, p. 3. 
 Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2591449 Accessed April 10th 2020 
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1.1.1.1 Eliminating Costs of Listing: 
 
One major factor contributing to the costs of the listing are the obligations the listing 
entails, namely duties to report and disclose certain information.
8
 
1.1.1.1.1 Obligations on a European level: 
 
Such duties stem both from European directives as well as from national law. 
For example, according to Art. 2 para. 1 lit. a and Art. 17 Regulation 596/2014 (Market 
Abuse Regulation - MAR)
9
 listed companies are obliged to disclose insider information, 
maintain a list of insiders according to Art. 18 MAR, and disclose directors’ dealings 
according to Art. 19 MAR. 
 
In addition to these obligations Regulation 2017/1129
10
 contains a number of 
obligations related to the prospectus, which according to Art. 1 para. 1 lit. a 
Regulation 2017/1129 has to be produced for all financial instruments which are traded 
on an organized market in the European Union. Beyond being forced to disclose a large 
amount of information, defined by Art. 13 Regulation 2017/1129, an issuer is also liable 
for any mistakes in the prospectus under Art. 11 para. 1 Regulation 2017/1129. 
 
1.1.1.1.2 Obligations on a national Level: 
 
Furthermore, there are several provisions of British and German national law that deal 
only with listed companies.
11
  
 
1.1.1.1.3 Evaluation: 
 
These duties demand the dedication of considerable resources, both in terms of time and 
money.
12
 
 
                                                 
8
 Pfüller, Markus and Anders, Dietmar “Delisting-Motive vor dem Hintergrund neuerer Rechtsentwicklungen” 
(Motives for delisting in light of the background of new legal developments), Neue Zeitschrift für 
Gesellschaftsrecht (2003), p. 460; Walz, Susanne „§ 50 Going Private – Rückzug von der Börse“ (§ 50 Going 
Private - retreat from the stock market) in Münchner Anwaltshandbuch Aktienrecht (Munich lawyers handbook 
to stock law), edited by Matthias Schüppen, and Bernhard Schaub, Munich: C.H. Beck, 3rd edition 2018, recital 
11; 
Holzborn, Timo and Hilpert, Christian „Wechsel in den Freiverkehr als Rückzug aus dem regulierten Markt ohne 
Delisting – Eine effektive Möglichkeit zur Kostensenkung für Mittelständler? –“ (Downlisting as a retreat from 
the regulated market without delisting – an effective possibility for SMEs to decrease costs?-), Zeitschrift für 
Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht (2010), p. 1347. 
9
 Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse 
(market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC. 
10
 Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the prospectus 
to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market, and 
repealing Directive 2003/71/EC. 
11
 Walz, Susanne „§ 50 Going Private – Rückzug von der Börse“ (§ 50 Going Private - retreat from the stock 
market) in Münchner Anwaltshandbuch Aktienrecht (Munich lawyers handbook to stock law), ed. Matthias 
Schüppen and Bernhard Schaub, Munich: C.H. Beck, 3rd edition 2018, recital 11. 
12
 Pfüller, Markus and Anders, Dietmar “Delisting-Motive vor dem Hintergrund neuerer Rechtsentwicklungen” 
(Motives for delisting in light of the background of new legal developments), Neue Zeitschrift für 
Gesellschaftsrecht (2003), p. 461. 
 5 
 
Additionally, as these duties are regularly expanded, companies might be faced with 
rising costs of a listing, that go beyond what they initially expected and that are no 
longer justified by the benefits of the listing.
13
 
 
The influence of these costs for a company’s decision to delist is evidenced by the 
development in the numbers of delistings after the introduction of extensive reporting 
and disclosure duties. 
In 2002 in the United States such duties were introduced or expanded trough the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), leading to an increase in delistings from just four in 2002 to 
101 in 2003.
14
 Similarly, in 2005 the European Union adopted the International 
Financial Reporting Standards, increasing the costs of maintaining a listing, and again 
leading to a raise in the numbers of observed delistings.
15
 
 
1.1.1.2 Lack of benefits:  
 
Another component of a company’s decision to delist are the benefits that the listing 
brings the company. If these are no longer sufficient, as the listing no longer fulfils its 
function as intended at the time of the Initial Public Offering, the company may decide 
to delist. 
 
As the primary function of the listing is the procurement of capital this may be the case 
once the further influx of capital is no longer needed, either because the company sees 
no need or opportunity to expand, or because the company is able to satisfy its needs 
from its own cashflow.
16
 
 
The listing may also lose its function in the eyes of the company if a low stock price 
prevents a sufficient capitalization trough the stock market.
17
 
 
Similarly, the ability to attract investors for an Initial Public Offering requires a certain 
visibility, which is dependent on the coverage of the company by relevant analysts.
18
 
Therefore, if the company lacks sufficient coverage it may not be able to efficiently 
attract investors on the stock market.
19
 
 
On the other end of the spectrum, as the potential for growth is smaller if the company 
is closely monitored, a non-listed company may be more attractive to private equity 
investors.
20
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Pfüller and Anders, supra note 12. 
14
 Martinez, Isabell and Serve, Stephanie and Djama, Constant “Reasons for delisting and consequences: A 
literature review and research agenda”, p. 7. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2591449 Accessed June 10th 
2020 
15
 Martinez et al, supra note 14. 
16
 Walz, supra note 11, § 50 Rn. 12. 
17
 Pfüller and Anders, supra note 12. 
18
 Ibid, p.461. 
19
 Martinez et al, supra note 14, p.5. 
20
 Maume, “The Parting of the Ways: Delisting Under German and UK Law” European Business Organization 
Law Review (2015), p. 258; Tuttino, M. and Panetta, I.C. and Laghi, E. “Going dark in Italy. Empirical evidence 
on last decade”, p. 4. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2179058 Accessed April 10th 2020. 
 6 
 
1.1.1.3 Enhanced Control: 
 
Related to the listing as well is the question of control over the company, both in direct 
terms through the sale of shares on the stock market and the corresponding controlling 
rights, as well as in less direct terms trough market pressure on the company and its 
management. 
 
While a company bears the above-mentioned costs, it is also subject to a certain 
pressure from the capital market, which materializes itself in the development of the 
stock prices. 
As a result, a company may feel pressure to prioritize short term earnings and 
corresponding dividends over investments which pay off only in the long term, so 
delisting may be undertaken to avoid such pressure and enable long-term investments.
21
 
 
Furthermore, the availability of a company’s stocks on the stock market, as it gives the 
possibility to acquire shares up to certain thresholds anonymously, can facilitate a 
hostile takeover.
22
 In order to prevent such an attempt a company may decide to remove 
its shares from the open market, thereby limiting their sale to individual public 
offerings.
23
 
 
Lastly according to some authors delisting may be employed as a remedy to interagency 
conflicts.
24
 For companies with a diffuse ownership structure there can be a separation 
of control and ownership as the owners are unable to exert effective control, de facto 
empowering management to exert control.
25
 Delistings, trough leveraged buy-outs, 
provide a possibility to consolidate ownership, thus eliminating or at least alleviate 
interagency conflicts.
26
 
 
This primarily effects U.S. and British companies, as companies’ ownership in 
continental Europe is typically more concentrated.
27
 
 
1.1.1.4 Restructuring measures: 
 
As restructuring measures of publicly listed companies attract significant attention, 
which may be of detrimental effect, a company may decide to cancel its listing in order 
to carry out restructuring or remedial measures.
28
 
1.1.2 For the majority shareholder: 
1.1.2.1 Costs and Lack of benefits: 
 
                                                 
21
 Walz, „§ 50 Going Private – Rückzug von der Börse“ in Münchner Anwaltshandbuch Aktienrecht, ed. M. 
Schüppen and B. Schaub, recital 12; Pfüller and Anders “Delisting-Motive vor dem Hintergrund neuerer 
Rechtsentwicklungen”, Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (2003), p. 461. 
22
 Pfüller and Anders, supra note 12, p. 461. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Martinez et al, supra note 14, p. 8.  
25
 Tuttino et al, “Going dark in Italy. Empirical evidence on last decade”, p. 7; Martinez et al, supra note 14, p. 
8. 
26
 Tuttino et al, “Going dark in Italy. Empirical evidence on last decade”, p. 3. 
27
 Tuttino et al, “Going dark in Italy. Empirical evidence on last decade”, p. 3; Martinez et al, “Reasons for 
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One major consequence of a listing for shareholders is the ability to quickly and easily 
sell their shares. 
 
However, as a majority shareholder will often pursue strategic and long-term goals the 
shares liquidity is not a primary concern for him.
29
 Additionally, large blocks of shares 
are by nature less liquid and are frequently traded outside the stock markets regardless 
of the company’s listing.30 
 
 
Beyond that the majority shareholder may be unable to use the listing to sell his stocks 
without risking losing his control over the company or impairing the markets trust in the 
company, which could decrease stock prices, devaluating his majority share in the 
company.
31
 
 
Regarding the listing’s other benefits, as the majority shareholder typically has a closer 
connection to the company and its management than other shareholders, the benefits he 
draws from the obligations for reporting and disclosure entailed by the listing are 
limited.
32
 At the same time the majority shareholder bears most of the costs of the 
listing through his majority share.
33
 
 
Furthermore, the majority shareholder will frequently pursue a delisting if the stock’s 
price is below the value of the share.
34
 
 
1.1.2.2 Enhanced control: 
 
As delisting impacts the minority shareholder negatively it may be used as a tool to 
push out minority shareholders and solidify the majority shareholders control.
35
 
1.1.3 For the minority shareholder: 
In general benefits reaped by the company are passed on to the shareholders in the form 
of dividends. Therefore, minority shareholders theoretically could profit from a delisting 
decision. Yet in reality from the perspective of a minority shareholder the risks of 
delisting will outweigh the benefits. 
 
Still, there may be certain cases in which the minority shareholder might have an 
interest in delisting, namely when delisting is intended to support remedial measures. 
                                                 
29
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30
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31
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Nonetheless, even in such cases, the minority shareholder might find that his interests 
are best served by selling his shares.
36
 
1.2 Risks: 
The negative consequences of delisting mainly spring from two factors, the loss of the 
visibility of the listing and the decrease in the share’s value and liquidity. 
1.2.1 For the company: 
In addition to providing capitalization the listing also brings other benefits. In particular 
listing leads to greater overall visibility for the company, and can boost the company’s 
image, facilitating the acquisition of both new clients and new employees.
37
 
1.2.2 For the majority shareholder: 
A mentioned above, a majority shareholder will often be less concerned with the share’s 
liquidity.
38
 In combination with the fact that large blocks of shares are by nature less 
liquid and are frequently traded outside the stock markets regardless of the company’s 
listing this limits the risks of delisting for the majority shareholder.
39
 
 
Furthermore, given the majority shareholder’s influence it is highly unlikely that a 
company’s management would decide to delist against the will of the majority 
shareholder.
40
 
 
In conclusion, the assumption of risks particularly affecting the majority shareholder 
seems far-fetched. 
1.2.3 For the minority shareholder: 
With regards to the interests of minority shareholders during delisting it should be noted 
that minority shareholders are only united by the fact that they own a share of 
theoretically up to 49 percent of the company and are otherwise not a homogenous 
group.
41
 Hence the attribute minority shareholder conveys no information whether the 
shareholder in question is a private individual, an employee, an institutional or 
professional investor. 
 
Therefore, the interests of minority shareholders in this situation may diverge 
significantly. For example, an institutional investor might be bound by his terms and 
conditions to invest only in listed stocks.
42
 Thus delisting would effectively force him to 
sell his shares, while other shareholders might still hold on to them. 
 
                                                 
36
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Due to their smaller, non-controlling share, their influence on the company’s decision-
making process is, at best, limited.
43
 Therefore the economic aspects of their share are 
of central importance to minority shareholders.
44
  
 
While some institutional and professional shareholders might pursue strategic goals, 
these goals are likely to either be directed towards acquiring a controlling stake in the 
company, or to be related to the company’s policy with regards to dividends. 
 
For the average minority shareholder however, the share is primarily a tool for 
investment.
45
 Regularly this means that minority shareholders will acquire shares in 
order to sell them at a later point when their price has risen.
46
 
 
In order for them to successfully do so the shares have to both increase or at least hold 
their value and remain easily tradeable. 
 
Both of these characteristics may be influenced by delisting. 
 
1.2.3.1 Prices: 
 
At first glance the value of a certain share seems like a clear and object circumstance, 
that is easy to trace. Yet, with regards to delisting this task is complicated by the fact, 
that share prices can no longer be derived from the stock market and that companies are 
also no longer subject to the various reporting and disclosure obligations. Hence, the 
exact development of a shares price after delisting can be hard to measure.
47
 
 
The main tool deployed to assess the effects of an event on stock prices are event 
studies.
48
 These studies compare a stock’s expected normal performance without the 
event in question with the actual performance following the event.
49
 A prerequisite for 
these studies to be accurate is the assumption that the capital markets efficiently, i.e. 
immediately, process the available information.
50
 This assumption has been confirmed 
in the past.
51
 Through this approach general market influences are automatically 
accounted for and do not influence the study’s outcome.52 
 
However, a reliable conclusion can only be reached if the effect shown by the study is 
statistically significantly different from the expected performance, as otherwise the 
divergence in performance may be due to random chance.
53
 
 
As delisting eliminates a number of costs it enables the company to increase its value 
creation after completion. As a result, an increase in share value might be expected as 
                                                 
43
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44
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potential investors could expect a higher return in the future, motivating them to pay a 
premium on the shares.
54
 
 
This assumption is backed by some studies, which found that delisting lead to a 
premium of up to 40 percent.
55
 While these studies primarily observed companies 
delisting from U.S. markets, they also included observations of British and continental 
European markets. 
On British and continental European markets, the expected premium was found to be 
lower, at 29 and 20 percent respectively, diverging considerably from the situation on 
U.S. markets.
56
 
 
It should be noted, that these studies were no event-studies, and therefore are, as 
explained above, less reliable. 
 
However, their findings have also been somewhat duplicated in number of event 
studies.
57
 Taking the same geographical bases as the above studies, event studies 
showed the influence of a delisting announcement to be on average an increase in price 
by 12,5 percent in continental Europe and 14,9 percent in the UK.
58
 
 
Notably, while they show a lower increase in stock price, these event studies also 
support both the general tendency of an increase in stock prices, as well as the 
difference between the stock prices reaction in the United States, and to a lesser degree 
in the UK, and in continental Europe. 
 
On the other hand, if the liquidity of stocks is an important factor, the loss of that factor 
could lower the share’s value in the eyes of potential investors, weighing on the prices.59 
 
This idea has been supported by a number of studies on delisting’s in Germany.60 
 
In this regard it has to be noted that. before the German Supreme Courts 
FroSTA-jugdement, rendered on 08.10.2013, delistings in Germany where subject to a 
mandatory offer by the issuer. This offer stabilized prices, and with that distorted the 
results of studies carried out before said judgement.
61
 
 
A study conducted by the Solventis Wertapierhandelsbank (Solventis Stock-trading 
bank) in 2014, based on 37 delistings, found the average loss in share prices to be 25 
percent, in individual cases reaching up to 80 percent.
62
 Removing those delistings, 
which had been announced together with a buy-out offer, the average loss in share 
prices stood at -9,58 percent on the day following the announcement.
63
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As this study simply compares prices on the day before and after the delisting 
announcement it is not an event study, notably the results are also not adjusted for 
general market effects and other interferences.
64
 
 
Nonetheless the findings of the Solventis-study are supported by a number of 
subsequent event studies, which found divergences in performance by an average of 
minus ten percent one day after the delisting-announcement.
65
 
These negative reactions were also shown to still be present after 20 days in around 
75 percent of cases and can therefore be considered significant.
66
 
 
However, some authors note the impact of a small number of extreme cases on the 
overall outcome.
67
 After assessing the spread, others conclude, that two thirds of all 
cases do not show economically significant, meaning a divergence of more than five 
percent, negative reactions.
68
 
 
These results seem contrary to each other, can however be explained by a number of 
factors. 
 
First, as delisting is not a mass phenomenon these studies often include a relatively 
small number of samples, mostly around 30 to 40.
69
 This could result in the distortion of 
results by a small number of extreme and possibly abnormal cases, a possibility which 
has to some extend been observed by some of the authors themselves.
70
 
 
Second, due to the different shareholder structure U.S. and European stock markets are 
not comparable, as delisting offers more benefits in the U.S due to the higher possibility 
of interagency conflicts.
71
 
 
Third, it needs to be noted, that the studies showing an increase in share prices were 
conducted before the FroSTA-Judgement,
72
 therefore including cases where a buy-
out offer was made, distorting the results. 
 
In conclusion, the effects of delisting on a stock’s price depend on the general 
circumstances, such as a company’s ownership structure, leading to possible 
divergences between continental Europe and the UK.
73
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However, considering that those event studies which did not include delistings 
including buy-out offers, and can therefore be considered most reliable, found a 
negative impact on stock prices, it seems reasonable to assume that delisting usually 
leads to a loss of share value, with the precise extend of that loss subject to the 
individual company’s characteristics. This especially affects minority shareholders, 
which focus more on a share’s economic rights than on its control rights.74 
 
1.2.3.2 Liquidity: 
 
An even more consequential effect of delisting for minority shareholders could however 
be a decrease in the stock’s liquidity, i.e. its factual ability to be traded. 
 
As described above, minority shareholders’ main goal is to realize economic gains by 
selling their shares once their price has increased. Independently of how share prices are 
affected by delisting this goal requires minority shareholders to have the continued 
ability to sell their stock, making the shares liquidity an important characteristic in the 
minority shareholders’ eyes. 
 
In order to determine a shares liquidity several indicators are used, namely the volume 
of trade, the number of days on which the share is actively traded and the bid-ask-
spread.
75
 The bid-ask-spread attests to costs of an immediate trade, from which the 
markets breadth can be determined.
76
 
 
By measuring these indicators several studies found a decrease in liquidity for shares.
77
 
However, there was no clear indication of a systematic drop in all indicators that 
persisted until the delisting took effect.
78
 
 
These findings however concern only the timespan between the announcement and the 
taking effect of the delisting. 
 
Once the delisting takes effect the stock market as a venue for selling shares is no longer 
available and with it a significant part of the share’s liquidity.79 
 
As the ability to react to the development of a stock’s price is a prerequisite to be able to 
realize any potential increase in the share’s value this significantly affects minority 
shareholders.
80
 Beyond the organized stock market there are no comparable alternatives 
in this regard.
81
 Notably, outside the stock market the shareholder has to find a buyer 
and negotiate an appropriate price for his shares himself, which increases transaction 
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costs, impacting the minority shareholders’ main goal of reaping economic benefits 
from his shares.
82
 
 
 
Another consequence of a delisting announcement tied to the tradability of shares is the 
minority shareholder’s freedom to freely reach their decision on a possible 
disinvestment. As they are dependent on the tradability the listing entails, after the 
delisting announcement minority shareholders will be compelled to sell their shares.
83
 
However, as other investors will be cautious about investing at this moment, the circle 
of potential buyers may be reduced to the majority shareholder, which could use the 
situation to dictate undue terms to the minority shareholders.
84
 
 
1.2.3.3 Other: 
 
Additionally, minority shareholders, who lack the majority shareholder’s influence on 
and insight into the company, profit from the stock markets requirements for disclosure 
and reporting.
85
 
 
Notably, the aspect of the stock market as a provider of information and the price of the 
share can also intersect. As minority shareholders lack insight into the company the 
shares price on the stock is an important indicator for them. After delisting this indicator 
is no longer available, further complicating any potential sale and increasing transaction 
costs.
86
 
1.3 Conclusion: 
In terms of the interests involved delisting presents itself as a conflict of the interests of 
the company and the majority shareholder on one side and the minority shareholders on 
the other side.
87
 
 
In this situation the main interest on the side of the company and the majority 
shareholder, motivated by the desire to cut the costs associated with the listing in order 
to increase the potential for value creation, to be able to delist the company as easily as 
possible. This interest conflicts with minority shareholders’ interest in being able to sell 
their shares quickly and with minimum effort at an adequate price in order to utilize 
them effectively as a means of investment.
88
 
2 CHAPTER TWO EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK: 
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As European Union Law enjoys precedence over national law in its application any 
European regulation dealing with delistings would shape a member states national 
legislator possibility to regulate delistings.
89
 
2.1 Primary Union Law: 
Neither the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) nor the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU) contain specific provisions regarding delisting. 
 
In theory the free movement of capital, granted by Art. 63 TFEU, could limit member 
states legislator’s freedom in regulating delisting. Nonetheless, no obligation to pass 
regulation offering financial compensation can be based on Art. 63 TFEU.
90
 
 
The question whether a national regulation is compatible with Art. 63 TFEU depends on 
that national regulation. Notably in this regard Art. 63 TFEU is subject to the 
justifications of Art. 65 TFEU and the cassis-formula of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union,
91
 according to which an infringement is justified, if it serves necessary 
public interests.
92
 The minority shareholders’ interests affected by delisting, notably the 
right of disposal and the significant loss of value, constitute such a necessary public 
interest, and would justify a restriction of the free movement of capital.
93
 
2.2 Secondary Union Law: 
So far neither a regulation nor a directive dealing directly with delisting has been 
passed.  
 
However, Art. 21 of the directive 2012/30/EU formulates the principle of equal 
treatment of shareholders in the same situation.  Such a principle could in theory 
necessitate a buy-out offer by the majority shareholder.
94
 This interpretation has 
however been denied by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the past.
95
 
2.3 EU Charta of fundamental rights and ECHR: 
2.3.1 EU Charta of Human Rights: 
Art. 17 of the Charta protects the possession, usage, disposal and inheritance of legally 
acquired ownership. According to Art. 6 TEU the Charta has the same weight as any 
norm of the TEU or TFEU, meaning it would enjoy precedence in its application over 
national law. However, as per Art. 51 para. 1 s. 1 of the Charta it only binds member 
states with regards to the implementation of Union law. As explained above, union law 
                                                 
89
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does not regulate delistings, so that the Charta does not influence the national regulation 
of delistings.
96
 
 
 
 
2.3.2 ECHR: 
Ownership is protected under Art. 1 para. 1 of the additional protocol to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
 
Although to Art. 6 para. 2 TEU envisages the European Union’s accession to the ECHR 
this has not yet taken place. Therefore, the ECHR is not (yet) relevant.  
 
Additionally, the protection of ownership under the ECHR does not include the 
realization of economical chances, which, unlike the ownership itself, are impacted by 
delisting.
97
 
2.4 Conclusion: 
Although the need for harmonization of delistings has been discussed, as of now, no 
uniform European legal framework exists. The member states national legislators are 
therefore not obliged to regulate delisting.
98
 Should they choose to regulate the matter 
there are no restrictions trough European Law with regards to the if and how of 
delisting.
99
 
3 CHAPTER THREE: GERMANY 
In Germany delisting is regulated by § 39 Stock Exchange Act (Börsengesetz – BörsG). 
The details of which will be presented and analysed in the following.  
3.1 Historical overview: 
In the past the German law has undergone many significant changes, some caused by 
judgements from both the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) and the Federal Constitutional 
Court (BVerfG). 
3.1.1 Original Situation: 
The possibility to cancel the listing at the issuers’ request was introduced in Germany in 
1998 with § 43 para. 4 BörsG in its original version. Before that the possibility of such a 
transaction was disputed. The lack of a clear option to apply for the cancelation of the 
listing lead some companies to choose to violate their obligations to provoke an 
involuntary delisting.
100
 § 43 para. 4 BörsG a.F. only stipulated that the cancellation 
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may not be contrary to the investor’s protection, with the stock markets empowered to 
regulate the question of when that was the case in their administrative rules. For 
example, until 2002 the Frankfurt stock exchange demanded a buy-out offer before in 
2002 switching to a six-month grace period.
101
 
 
3.1.2 Macrotron: 
Clarification was first brought about by the BGH with its decision in Macrotron.
102
 
The BGH held that delisting would impact the factual tradability of shares,
103
 especially 
impacting minority shareholders and carrying grave economic disadvantages for 
them.
104
 
With reference to past decisions of the BVerfG the BGH argued, that the tradability of 
shares was an important component of ownership of a share, and therefore protected 
under Art. 14 para. 1 of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz – GG).105 
 
Furthermore, the BGH stated, that delisting was to be seen as a question of the 
memberships assets, and therefore would fall under the competence of the general 
meeting.
106
 
 
As the general meetings’ involvement alone however was insufficient in the eyes of the 
BGH to adequately protect minority shareholders’ rights it interpreted the prerequisite 
of “not running contrary to the investors’ protection” in § 43 para. 4 BörsG a.F. as only 
being satisfied if the request for a decision of the general meeting was combined with a 
buy-out offer.
107
 
 
In order to ensure the functioning of the buy-out offer as a means of protection of 
minority shareholders’ economic rights the BGH argued, that the offer should be subject 
to a judicial review under expedited shareholder action (Spruchverfahren
108
).
109
 
3.1.3 MVS/Lindner: 
In 2012 the BverfG was confronted with the question of whether delisting could indeed 
be seen, as the BGH had argued in Macrotron, as interfering with the constitutional right 
to ownership under Art. 14 para. I GG.
110
 
 
The BVerfG argued that the tradability of the shares, connected to the listing, only 
constituted an economic chance, and was therefore not protected under Art. 14 para. 1 
GG.
111
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With this assessment the BVerfG withdrew the dogmatic reason for Macrotron.
112
 The 
BVerfG, however did not answer the question whether that could be different if the 
shareholders suffered economic losses due to delisting.
113
 
Notably, the BVerfG also mentioned the possibility of an overall analogy to other norms 
of company law governing measures with structural consequences for the company.
114
 
3.1.4 FroSTA: 
The BGH reacted to MVS/Lindner in the FroSTA
115
 decision by abandoning the 
principles laid out in Macrotron. With regards to the possibility of an overall analogy, 
opened by the BVerfG in MVS/Lindner, the BGH argued that, as delisting introduced 
no changes to the internal structure of the company, it was not comparable to other 
structural measures.
116
 Referring to the grace periods demanded by several stock 
markets in their administrative rules the BGH stated that there was no lack of 
protection, and therefore no need for further requirements.
117
 Additionally, the BGH 
argued that there was no indication for a decrease in the stock’s price.118 
 
Due to these considerations the BGH ruled that there were no grounds to pose special 
requirements for delisting from a company law perspective, resulting in the prerequisite 
of the cancellation not being “contrary to the protection of investors” under the BörsG 
being the sole rule, with the details to be regulated by the stock markets in their 
administrative codes.
119
  
3.1.5 Stock markets administrative codes: 
The stock markets took different approaches in ensuring that the cancellation was not 
“contrary to the protection of investors”. In reaction to the new regulatory framework, 
a sharp increase in delistings was observed.
120
 
3.2 Current legal framework in Germany: 
3.2.1 § 39 Börsengesetz: 
Nowadays delistings in Germany are governed by § 39 BörsG. § 39 BörsG was 
introduced in its current form in 2015 in reaction to the FroSTA decision.
121
 
 
While paragraph one of § 39 BörsG deals with involuntary delistings paragraphs two to 
six govern voluntary delistings. 
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3.2.1.1 Issuer’s request: 
 
According to §39 para. 2 sentence 1 BörsG upon the issuer’s request the stock markets 
administration can cancel the listing. 
 
The request to cancel the listing constitutes an administrative measure and as such under 
§ 77 para.1 Stock market law (Aktiengesetz - AktG) falls under the sole competence of 
the issuer’s board of directors.122 
 
Due to the restrictions for the possible content of the articles of association laid out by 
§ 23 para. 5 AktG the articles of association may not require the inclusion of the general 
meeting into the decision.
123
 Under § 111 para. 4 AktG the articles of association, 
however, may require the supervisory boards consent.
124
 
 
3.2.1.2 Stock market administration’s discretion: 
 
As the wording of § 39 BörsG “the administration may” indicates the decision whether 
or not to cancel a listing is at the stock markets administration’s discretion.125 In 
exercising their discretionary power the administration must balance the issuers and the 
shareholders’ interests.126 
 
However, this discretionary power is curbed in both directions. 
On one hand, the issuer has a right to the cancellation.
127
 On the other hand with regards 
to allowing the cancellation the stock markets administration’s discretionary power is 
narrowed by the prerogative that the cancellation may not run contrary to investors’ 
protection, laid out by § 39 subparagraph 2 sentence 2 BörsG.128 
 
With regards to all financial instruments that fall within the scope of 
§ 2 para. 2 Stock Acquisition and Takeover Law (Wertpapiererwerbs- und 
Übernahmegesetz - WpÜG), notably also for equity shares,129 
§ 39 para. 2 sentence 3 BörsG clarifies this condition. Under 
§ 39 para. 2 sentence 3 No. 1 BörsG the cancelation may only be granted if the request 
includes a buy-out offer. Alternatively, under § 39 para. 2 sentence 3 Nr. 2 BörsG the 
cancellation may as well be granted if the stocks in question will continue to be listed 
either on a domestic organized market, or on an organized market in the EU or the EEA, 
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if the requirements for delisting on that market are equal to § 39 para. 2 sentence 3 No. 
1 BörsG. 
 
 
 
As a result, the stock markets’ administrations are not granted free discretion in their 
decision, but only wield a dutiful discretionary power within the limits of 
§ 39 para. 2-6 BörsG. Notably, should the mandatory prerequisites laid out there not be 
met, the discretionary power to allow a cancelation is reduced to zero.
130
 
 
Further limitations of the stock market’s discretionary power result from 
§ 39 para. 6 BörsG, according to which an insufficient price offered in the buy-out offer 
does not influence the validity of the cancellation. This has to be interpreted as 
removing the question whether the buy-out offer is adequate from the administration’s 
decision-making process.
131
 
 
Therefore, regarding the if of the cancellation the administration’s discretionary power 
is strongly restricted.
132
 However, regarding the modalities of the cancellation, they may 
exercise their discretion by delaying the entry into force of the cancellation up to two 
years, as per § 39 para. 5 sentence 2 BörsG.133  
 
3.2.1.1 Buy-out offer: 
 
As § 39 BörsG does not specify who can make the buy-out offer either the issuer, 
the majority shareholder, or even a third party may make the offer.
134
 As the issuer 
would have to comply with § 71 AktG, which regulates the buying of a company’s own 
shares, in reality, the majority shareholder will most often make the offer.
135
 
 
In order for the buy-out offer to be sufficient, it has to satisfy a number of conditions. 
 
3.2.1.1.1 Preconditions: 
 
According to § 39 para. 2 sentence 3 No. 1 BörsG the offer has to encompass all stocks 
that are subject to the delisting request and it has to have been published in accordance 
with the rules of the WpÜG. 
 
This means that according to § 14 WpÜG the offeree has to submit the relevant 
documentation to the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BAFin). The mandatory 
information of an offer is laid out by § 11 WpÜG. Notably, as stipulated by Art. 2 Nr. 7 
Stock Acquisition and Takeover Law-Acquisition Regulation 
(Wertpapierübernahmegesetz-Angebotsverordnung - WpÜG-AngV) the offer has to 
contain additional information regarding the future request for the cancellation of the 
listing, including a mandatory reference to the possible restrictions of the stocks 
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tradability as a result of the cancellation and the corresponding possible decrease in 
price. 
 
 
 
3.2.1.2.1 Characteristics of the offer: 
 
According to § 39 para. 3 sentence 1 BörsG the offer may not be conditional. 
 
Furthermore, § 39 para. 3 sentence 2 BörsG stipulates that § 31 WpÜG is applicable to 
the offer with the exception that the offer under § 39 para. 2 sentence 3 No. 1 BörsG has 
to offer an exchange in the form of a monetary payment in Euro. The amount offered 
may not be lower than the average price of the stocks on domestic stock markets during 
the last six months before the publication of the delisting under § 10 para. 1 sentence 1 
or § 35 para. 1 sentence 1 BörsG. 
 
Should the issuer have violated Art. 17 MAR or a similar rule of applicable foreign law 
by not publishing insider information, or by publishing false information, or have 
violated the prohibition of market manipulation under Art. 15 MAR, the offeree is 
obliged under § 39 para. 3 sentence 3 BörsG to pay the difference between the amount 
offered and the amount that is calculated from the company’s value. 
 
However, this is only the case if the above-mentioned violations had a significant 
impact on the stock’s price. As a single strong fluctuation in price may not be 
significant if viewed in the context of a six-month time period, the term “significant” 
under § 39 para. 3 sentence 3 BörsG has to interpreted independently of 
Art. 7 para. 1 lit. a MAR.
136
  The legislator has however in § 39 para. 3 sentence 4 
BörsG attached special consequences to a fluctuation of five percent or more. Therefore, 
this five percent value can be taken as a starting point in determining the significance of 
a violation for a stock’s price under § 39 para. 3 sentence 3 BörsG.137 
 
According to § 39 para. 3 sentence 4 BörsG if the stocks that are subject to the offer 
formed a market price on less than a third of the stock markets working days during the 
last six months before the publication of the delisting under § 10 para. 1 sentence 1 or § 
35 para. 1 sentence 1 BörsG, and several of these market prices diverge from one 
another by more than five percent, the offeree is obliged to pay a sum determined by the 
company’s value as well. 
 
3.2.1.2.2 Foreign issuers: 
 
Under § 39 para. 4 BörsG the offer of a foreign issuer is subject to the requirements laid 
out by § 39 para. 3 BörsG as well. 
 
3.2.1.2.3 Publication of the offer: 
 
According to § 39 para. 5 sentence 1 BörsG the stock markets administration has to 
publish a notice of the cancellation on the internet immediately. 
 
                                                 
136
 Kumpan, supra note 127, recital 9. 
137
 Ibid. 
 21 
 
3.2.1.3 Exception to the mandatory buy-out offer: 
 
Under § 39 para. 2 sentence 3 Nr. 2 lit. a BörsG if the stock in question will be 
continually listed on a regulated domestic market the buy-out offer is not mandatory. 
Under § 39 para. 2 sentence 3 No. 2 lit. b BörsG if the stock in question continues to be 
listed on a regulated market in the EU or the EEA, if the requirements for delisting on 
that market are equal to § 39 para. 2 sentence 3 No. 1 BörsG, the buy-out offer in not 
necessary as well. 
 
Although the term “regulated market“ is not defined in the BörsG, it is defined in 
§ 2 para. 11 Stock Trading Law (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz - WpHG), where the 
definition is based on the MIFID II directive. Therefore, this definition can be utilized 
with regards to both § 39 para. 2 sentence 3 Nr. 2 lit. a and lit. b BörsG.138 
 
Additionally, the regulated market under § 39 para. 2 sentence 3 No. 2 lit. b BörsG must 
have equal requirements to § 39 para. 2 sentence 3 No. 1 BörsG in place, i.e. require a 
mandatory buy-out offer according to rules equal to those of the WpÜG.139 
 
3.2.1.4 Entry into force of the cancelation:  
 
Furthermore, according to § 39 para. 5 sentence 2 BörsG the cancellation has to enter 
into force within two years after the notice of cancellation under 
§ 39 para. 5 sentence 1 BörsG is published. 
 
3.2.1.5 Judicial review: 
 
As a stock market, when cancelling a listing under § 39 para. 2 BörsG, performs a 
public duty, the cancelation constitutes an administrative action and is therefore subject 
to the legal protection against administrative procedures.
140
 The initial public offering 
creates trust, which forms the base of an investor’s decision to acquire a certain share.141 
Therefore § 39 BörsG has to be qualified as a norm with protective effect towards third 
parties.
142
 Hence the individual Investor may initiate administrative procedures against 
the cancelation.
143
 
 
According to § 39 para. 6 BörsG the cancellation, however, may not be challenged in 
administrative courts if the price offered in the mandatory buy-out offer is argued to be 
insufficient. 
 
Instead, should a dispute arise offer the height of the buy-out offer the shareholders may 
file suit in civil courts,
144
 basing their action on § 31 WpÜG and § 39 para. 3 BörsG, 
which gives the shareholders a claim to the prescribed price.
145
 The Spruchverfahren is 
no longer available, however investors may launch a 
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Musterverfahren
146
 (exemplary action) under § 1 para. 1 No. 3  Investor-Exemplary 
Action Law (Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz - KapMuG).
147
 
3.2.2 Stock markets administrative rules: 
§ 39 para. 5 sentence 3 BörsG enables the stock markets to include further regulations 
for the cancellation of listings into their administrative rules. Yet as according to § 12 
para. 2 sentence 1 No. 1 BörsG these administrative rules have the status of bylaws, and 
are therefore hierarchically below the BörsG, it is commonly held, that the stock 
markets may not go beyond the detailed material prerequisites laid out in § 39 BörsG 
and may only regulate formal or technical aspects.
148
 
 
In practice, the stock markets have adopted by referencing the rules laid out by 
§ 39 para. 2-6 BörsG in their administrative rules.149 
3.3 Analysis of the current German Legal Framework: 
To compare the protection of minority shareholders in Germany and in the UK, it first 
needs to be established how the respective legislator has balanced the interests involved 
in delisting, and how effective the utilized instruments are in achieving the goal set out 
by the legislator. 
3.3.1 Balancing of interests: 
The previously existing legal framework, through the undefined legal term of “the 
cancellation not running contrary to investors protection”, gave the stock markets 
administrations discretion in its decision, enabling and obliging them to consider the 
issuer’s interests as well.150 The FroSTA-judgment represented a significant cut to the 
level of protection shareholders enjoyed. As a reaction to the FroSTA-jugdement and 
the wave of delistings that followed it the current German legislation was passed.
151
 
Consequently, it mainly focuses on restoring the level of protection granted to 
shareholders to an adequate level.
152
 As evidenced by the interests a stock market’s 
administrations has to consider in making its decision,
153
 the current German legislation 
is aimed at taking into account both the legitimate interest a company and its 
shareholder might have in delisting, as well as granting the necessary protection to 
minority shareholders. Therefore, it constitutes a balanced approached to the conflict of 
interests that delisting poses. 
3.3.2 Effectiveness of the instruments used: 
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The German legislator has taken the stance that delistings are to be viewed purely as a 
transaction under capital market law, and not as a structural measure under company 
law, consequently regulating the matter in the BörsG.154 
 
 
This decision was influenced by the assessment that the main risks for shareholders in 
delistings are the loss of tradability of the stock and the corresponding decrease in 
value.
155
 In light of the specific, financial,
156
 interests of minority shareholders this 
assessment seems reasonable. 
 
3.3.2.1 Buy-out Offer: 
 
The main instrument employed by the German legislator to protect minority 
shareholders from these risks is the mandatory buy-out offer under 
§ 39 para. 2 sentence 3 No. 1 BörsG. 
 
As it offers minority shareholders the opportunity to sell their shares at an adequate 
price the mandatory buy-out offer, in general, fits the idea of protecting minority 
shareholders’ financial interests.157  
 
This poses the question what constitutes an adequate price and how that price should be 
determined.
158
 If the price of the buy-out offer is to low it can no longer fulfil its 
function to protect minority shareholders’ financial interests. On the other hand, if the 
price is too high the buy-out offer shifts the economic calculation that drives the 
delisting decision,
159
 factually becoming a barrier to delistings.
160
 
 
The adequate price may either be found trough the stock’s market price or in reference 
to the company’s value. A determination of the adequate price from the company’s 
value could be significantly more costly, impacting the calculus of the issuer, and 
therefore the main shareholder.
161
 Yet, it also offers a more accurate picture of the 
share’s real value.162 On the other hand, the market price constitutes an easier and 
cheaper way of determining the adequate price, although due to the comparatively lower 
liquidity of stocks before delisting the market price may not always be an adequate 
representation of the shares real price.
163
  
 
With § 39 para. 3 sentence 2 BörsG the German legislator has opted to determine the 
adequacy of the buy-out offer by utilizing the market price. As the German legislator 
has adopted the prerogative that delisting does not impact shareholders’ membership but 
only the tradability of their share,
164
 this is the logical and stringent choice.
165
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Yet, if the limit for the price offered is determined by the average price on the stock 
market for the last six months, this might lead to an insufficient offer in those cases 
where the company is undervalued, i.e. where the price of the company’s stocks does 
not correspond to the value of the company itself. 
Notably, this is one of the possible causes for delisting,
166
 so that this possibility cannot 
be simply dismissed as an unlikely fringe occurrence. In these cases, the buy-out offer 
as envisaged by § 39 para. 3 BörsG would not provide a full compensation for the loss 
of their shares. Nonetheless, based on their primary financial interests minority 
shareholders are more accurately characterized as investors than as shareholders.
167
 
Hence, the fact that such excess value is not compensated does not constitute an 
irredeemable fault. When the increase in costs the only remedy to this fault, a valuation 
based on the company’s real value, would impose on the majority shareholder and the 
issuer are considered, this drawback has to be qualified as justifiable.  
 
As the issuer is free to pose his request to cancel the listing at any time he might choose 
to do so at a time when the stock’s price is significantly lower than usual.168 
 
In order to provide adequate protection to minority shareholders and to prevent such 
circumventive manoeuvres § 39 para. 3 sentence 2 BörsG stipulates that the offered 
price is to be fixed according to the average stock price over the relatively long period 
of the last six months, where such manipulations are likely to have only a smaller effect 
and not be significant.
169
 
 
Minority shareholders are granted further protection against manipulations of the market 
price by § 39 para. 3 sentence 3 BörsG, which determines the use of the company’s real 
value for fixing the minimum price of the buy-out offer in case of significant 
manipulations of the market price. However, due to the relatively long reference period, 
it again is unlikely that any manipulation would pass the threshold for significance.
170
 
 
If the stock is traded so infrequently that no reliable market price is formed, i.e. if the 
stocks lack sufficient liquidity for the market price to be an indication of the adequate 
price,
171
  § 39 para. 3 sentence 3 BörsG takes recourse to the company’s real value. 
 
In order to ensure that the conditions § 39 para. 3 BörsG formulates towards the offer 
are met in practice the offer as per § 14 WpÜG is to be submitted to BAFin prior to its 
publication. The BAFin then reviews the offer with regards to the adequacy of the 
offered price and the ability of the offeree to finance the offer.
172
 Should the BAFin find 
any of the preconditions lacking it may prohibit the offer under § 15 WpÜG. 
 
As the German legislator has taskde the BAFin with verifying the offer with regards to 
the more complex substantial requirements towards the offer the stock markets 
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administrations are relieved of this burden, facilitating an easy and legally certain 
procedure.
173
 
 
 
One concern that was brought forward against the mandatory buy-out offer was the 
possibility for parties interested in taking over a company to make a buy-out offer under 
§ 39 para. 2 sentence 2 No. 1 BörsG without ever carrying out a delisting or even 
intending to do so.
174
 Here the delisting offer might be used to undercut the regular 
take-over offer, which is determined according to the average stock price of the last 
three months.
175
 As these two preconditions to the offers are by now understood to be 
cumulative this concern has lost its basis.
176
 
 
3.3.2.2 Exceptions: 
 
As detailed above, under § 39 para. 2 sentence 3 No. 2 BörsG there are two cases in 
which a buy-out offer is not required. 
 
In the case of § 39 para. 2 sentence 3 No. 2 lit. a BörsG as the listing is sustained on a 
regulated domestic market, there are no changes to the legal and economic 
circumstances and therefore no risks for shareholders.
177
 
 
In the case of § 39 para. 2 sentence 3 No. 2 lit. b BörsG the listing is sustained, but on a 
foreign stock market. This theoretically opens up the possibility for issuers to move 
their listing to a market with a lower level of obligations, thereby cutting costs.  
 
In order to prevent such circumventive manoeuvres, the German legislator has limited 
the exception of § 39 para. 2 sentence 3 No. 2 lit. a BörsG to regulated markets in the 
EU or EEA, where the rules for disclosure and publication are likely similar, or, trough 
EU harmonization, equal.
178
 
 
This restriction to markets in the EU or the EEA has been criticized with the argument 
that American stock markets provide a similar, if not a higher level of investor 
protection.
179
 However, under the aspect of the increasing frequency of changes to 
capital market law and the continuing harmonization inside the EU and EEA this 
restriction has to be qualified as reasonable. 
 
To prevent circumvention of § 39 para. 2 sentence 2 No. 1 BörsG the German legislator 
has included the requirement of equal prerequisites for delisting on that market in 
§ 39 para. 2 sentence 3 No. 2 lit. b BörsG.180 
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While the idea that otherwise issuers might try to circumvent the mandatory offer seems 
sensible, in practice it needs to be noted that such a mandatory buy-out offer fixed 
according to the rules of the WpÜG is uncommon outside of Germany.181 This 
practically prevents the application of § 39 para. 2 sentence 3 No. 2 lit. b BörsG with 
regards to transfers of listings.
182
 
 
It has been argued that this restriction represents a violation of EU Law.
183
  In light of 
the fact that investor protection is a valid justification for infringements of Art. 63 
TFEU,
184
 and the fact that four years after the addition of this part to § 39 BörsG the 
Court of Justice of the European Union has not ruled on the matter however render 
these arguments unconvincing. 
 
3.3.2.3 Stock markets administrations discretion: 
 
As detailed above, the discretionary power of the administration in deciding whether to 
cancel a listing or not is significantly restricted by the detailed regulation the matter has 
found in § 39 para. 2-6 BörsG. Still, there remains some room for the administrations to 
balance the interests involved and ensure the necessary protection of minority 
shareholders. On major possibility to do so is the ability to delay the entry into force of 
the cancellation under § 39 para. 5 sentence 2 BörsG. In choosing to delay the entry into 
force the administration can provide investors with the possibility to prepare themselves 
for the cancellation and to possibly restructure their portfolio.
185
 
 
3.3.2.4 Judicial Review:  
 
How effective these rules can be in practice also depends on the possibilities awarded to 
shareholders for legal protection against any violations. As such action would entail the 
involvement of experts and therefore be quite costly, especially compared to the 
potentially small amount each shareholder could sue for, the risk exists that 
shareholders might opt not to pursue their rights.
186
 Trough granting investors the ability 
to pursue their claims under the Musterfeststellungsverfahren the German legislator 
seeks to offset these risks, ensuring the practical effect of § 39 para. 2 and 3 BörsG.187 
 
Especially in comparison to the previously employed Spruchverfahren the level of 
protection granted by the KapMUG has been criticized as insufficient, notably due to 
the facts that decisions will no longer act inter omnes and that claimants in the 
Musterverfahren will have to accurately state the height of their claim.
188
 
3.3.3 Conclusion: 
By opting for a buy-out offer as the main requirement for delisting the German 
legislator has, as explained above, created a regulatory framework that is tailored ideally 
towards protecting the minority shareholders’ interests. The downside to this high level 
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of protection is the significant financial effort a delisting under German law requires of 
the company or its majority shareholder. Yet, should they be able to afford it under the 
current German regulatory framework they are mostly free to undertake a delisting 
without being forced to undergo a lengthy or complicated process.  
 
In Conclusion with § 39 para. 2-6 BörsG the German legislator has struck a fair balance 
between the minority shareholders’ mostly financial interests and the company’s and its 
majority shareholder’s interest in leaving the stock market as freely as possible.  
4 CHAPTER FOUR: UK 
In thw UK the cancellation of the listing is regulated by the Financial Conduct 
Authorities (FCA) Listing Rules, the details of which will presented and analysed in the 
following.  
4.1 Historical Overview: 
The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) in its Part 9A Sec. 137A para. 1 
grants the Financial Services Authority the authority to pass the regulation it deems 
necessary for the protection of investors. 
 
Up to 2005 the FCAs Listing Rules (LR) did not contain any information on what organ 
of a company would be competent to ask for a cancellation of the listing or under what 
conditions such a request could be posed.
189
 
 
With the aim of providing investors with adequate protection in 2005 LR 5.2.5 was 
introduced, and with it the requirement of a resolution of the general meeting, passed 
with a majority of three quarters of the votes.
190
 
 
The next major change to the LR 5.2.5 was made in 2014.
191
 In cases where a majority 
shareholder was present, the requirement of a resolution by the general meeting was 
further expanded from a simple three-quarter majority to a two-tier majority. The two 
tiers require both a three-quarter majority of all votes, as well as a simple majority of all 
votes not held by the majority shareholder. 
 
Besides these two instances smaller changes to the Listing Rules have been made, 
however these were more of a corrective nature and do not represent important 
developments. 
4.2 Current legal framework in the UK: 
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The cancellation of a listing in the UK is governed by LR 5.2. While LR 5.2.1 deals 
with involuntary delisting, LR. 5.2.4 governs the cancellation of the listing of stocks 
listed at a premium market at the issuer’s request. 
 
The British legislator neither uses any undefined legal terms, which would give room 
for any discretion of the FCA whether or not to cancel the listing following the issuer’s 
request. Furthermore, Section 78A FSMA, which details the procedure does not give 
any other reason to assume such a discretionary power. 
Combined with the wording of LR 5.2.4 “the FCA will cancel the listing”, compared to 
the formulation chosen in cases where the FCA has discretionary power, such as LR 
5.3.7 para. 2 “the FCA may…if it considers it is necessary”, this makes it clear that the 
FCA holds no discretionary power. Instead its decision is entirely dependent on the 
fulfilment of the preconditions set out by LR 5.2.4 in conjunction with LR 5.2.5 until 
LR 5.2.11 and LR 5.3. 
4.2.1 Request:  
The conditions to be met by the request to cancel the listing are laid out in LR 5.3. 
Notably, under LR 5.3.1 the request must contain an explanation of the background and 
reasons for the cancellation. Under LR 5.3.1. para 4 the request must also contain the 
date, to be chosen by the issuer, on which the cancellation is to take effect. According 
LR 5.3.3 this date may not be within 24 hours of the request being formulated.  
4.2.2 Circular: 
Under LR 5.2.5 para. 1 the issuer is obliged to send a circular to the holders of its 
stocks. The contents of this circular are determined by LR 13.3.1, which is referenced 
by LR. 5.2.5. para. 1 lit. a. Under LR 13.3.1 para. 1 the circular must provide a clear 
explanation of its subject matter, detailing the benefits and risks. Furthermore under 
13.3.1 para. 3 it must contain all information necessary for the investor to make a 
properly informed decision. Under LR 13.3.1 para. 11 it must state whether it is the 
company’s intention to apply for the cancellation of its listing. According to LR 5.2.5. 
para. 1 lit. b the circular is to be submitted to the FCA prior to its publication for 
approval. 
 
Lastly, under LR 5.2.5 para. 1 lit. b the circular must contain the expected date of the 
cancellation, which may not be shorter than 20 business days after the adoption of a 
resolution by the general meeting to undertake the delisting. 
4.2.3 Resolution of the general meeting: 
According to LR 5.2.5 para. 2 no. 1 the issuer must obtain the approval of a majority of 
no less than three-quarters for the cancellation. 
 
In Addition, under LR 5.2.5 para. 2 no. 2, if there is a controlling shareholder, the 
approval of the majority of the independent shareholders is needed as well. A 
controlling shareholder does not necessarily have to be a majority shareholder. Instead 
any shareholder that controls, on their own or in concert with others, at least 30 percent 
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of the votes at the general meeting is to be qualified as a controlling shareholder.
192
 On 
the other hand, all other shareholders are classified as independent shareholders.
193
 
 
As is indicated by the wording in both variants “of the shares…voted on the resolution”, 
the necessary number of votes is calculated not in relation to all votes, but to the votes 
cast at the general meeting. This way of calculation is also in line with the general rule 
for majorities at the general meeting, as stipulated in section 283 subsection 3 
Companies Act 2006. 
4.2.4 Notification of a RIS: 
Under LR. 5.2.5 para. 3 the issuer has to notify a regulatory information service (RIS) 
of the convention of the general meeting, the intended cancellation and of the notice 
period.  This has to take place at the same time as the circular demanded in LR 5.2.5 
para. 1 is dispatched. Additionally, under LR 5.2.5 para. 4 a RIS needs to be informed 
of the passing of the general meeting’s resolution as well. 
 
A RIS can either be a person approved by the FCA under section 89P FSMA or an 
information service, that is seated in an EU or EEA member state and complies with the 
minimum standards laid out in the Directive 2004/109/EC.
194
 
4.2.5 Exceptions: 
Under LR 5.2.7 in cases of restructuring measures LR 5.2.5 para. 2, meaning the 
requirement of the general meetings approval, is not applicable.  
 
In these cases, the issuer under LR 5.2.7 para. 1 and 2 needs to inform a RIS that his 
position is so precarious, that he cannot foreseeably avoid going into bankruptcy, but a 
proposal for a restructuring exists that could avoid such a fate, and that this proposal, 
necessary to the continued survival of the issuer, would be jeopardized by the 
continuation of the listing. Additionally, under LR 5.2.7 para. 3 the issuer needs to 
explain why the cancellation is in the best interests of the company’s shareholders as 
well as its creditors, and why it will not seek the approval of the shareholders. 
 
Further exceptions from the requirements of LR 5.2.5 exist for cancellations in relation 
to take-over offers, LR 5.2.10, and cancellations as a result of schemes of arrangement, 
LR 5.2.12. 
4.2.6 Judicial Review: 
By Section 2 subsection 2 of the Transfer of Tribunal Functions Order 2010 all 
functions of the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal, which had previously been 
the competent instance for reviewing the FCAs decisions, where transferred to the 
Upper Tribunal. While in general only the addressee of a decisions is authorized to 
lodge an appeal, the tribunal may also permit third persons who are affected by the 
decision to refer the matter to the tribunal.
195
 Therefore individual shareholders are 
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enabled to lodge an appeal against the decision of the FCA as well. Notably, referring a 
decision to the tribunal does not entail a fee.
196
 
 
Additionally, a shareholder could challenge the general meeting’s resolution. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Analysis of the current British framework: 
4.3.1 Balancing of interests: 
When the current British legislation was passed, the declared intention of the 
Financial Service Authority (FSA)
197
 was to increase the protection of investors.
198
 At 
the same time, the FSA, as well as later on the FCA, explicitly sought to avoid a 
regulation that would give minority shareholders disproportionate power.
199
 All things 
considered, the British legislator has aimed to strike a balance between the interests of 
the parties involved. 
4.3.2 Effectiveness of the instruments used: 
4.3.2.1 General meeting’s approval: 
 
At the core of the British system stands the requirement of the general meeting’s 
approval. As a means of protecting minority shareholders this instrument faces some 
challenges. 
 
4.3.2.1.1 Dogmatic concerns: 
 
From a dogmatic point of view, the argument that delisting impacts the shareholder’s 
financial interests and not his membership itself may speak against solving the problem 
trough company law, i.e. against the requirement of the general meetings approval. 
While this line of reasoning is accurate in the case of German companies, British 
company law has a different system. Under Section 385 subsec. 2 Companies Act 2006 
only companies listed at a regulated market are quoted companies. Through this 
definition quoted companies form a specific type of public companies.
200
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Therefore, although the quoted company is regulated largely identical to the public 
company,
201
 delisting under British law leads to a change in the nature of the company. 
With that, delisting indeed represents a question of structural relevance under British 
law. Therefore, the dogmatic arguments brought forth against the regulation of the 
matter under company law in German literature are rendered at least partially invalid. 
 
4.3.2.1.2 Practical challenges: 
 
In practical terms, the fact that, the majority shareholders will almost certainly support 
the delisting,
202
 and use its voting power in support of it means that a simple resolution 
cannot adequately protect the interests of minority shareholders as they have no 
possibility to take decisive influence on the outcome of the vote.
203
 Therefore, they are 
restrained to the possibility of voicing their dissent by voting against the resolution.  
 
The British legislator has initially sought to remedy this fact by setting the threshold for 
the successful passage of the resolution of approval under LR 5.2.5 para. 2 no. 1 at 
75 percent.
204
 
 
Notably, under LR 6.14.1 a sufficient number of shares has to have been distributed to 
the public in order for the shares to be admitted to the list. LR 6.14.2 para. 2 clarifies 
that this is the case, when at least 25 percent of the shares are in public hands. As 
stipulated by LR 6.14.3 lit. e a majority shareholder’s shares are not to be counted as 
public. 
As a result, were the threshold of 75 percent the only requirement a controlling 
shareholder might list his firm, reap the benefits of the listing and then delist the 
company again without involving the minority shareholders. 
 
To prevent such undertakings LR 5.2.5 para. 2 no. 2 stipulates that, if there is a 
shareholder with a share in the company lager than 30 percent, a simple majority of the 
votes of independent shareholders has to be cast in favour of the resolution.
205
  
 
With this provision the above-mentioned problem is solved and the sufficient 
involvement of minority shareholders in the decision-making process is secured, at least 
in theory. 
 
4.3.2.1.3 Discrepancy in the rate of participation in the general meeting: 
 
However, it needs to be considered that the majority is not calculated from all votes, 
but, as explained above, only from the votes cast at the general meeting. 
 
This leads to a significant practical problem. As the majority shareholder is interested in 
the passing of the resolution he will use the full weight of his shares. At the same time 
minority shareholders primarily pursue financial goals and are therefore less interested 
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in taking part in the decision-making process.
206
 This could translate into a lower degree 
of involvement and with that into a lower likelihood of participation.  
 
Notably, especially private investors unfamiliar with the stock market may not be aware 
of the consequences of delisting or may simply assess that the potential influences on 
their investment are not worth the effort to participate in the general meeting. 
Additionally, their lack of individual influence may leave them with the feeling that 
they cannot influence the outcome, and that participating in the general meeting would 
therefore be futile.
207
 
 
Some studies have found that in the UK on average only one in a thousand shareholders 
participates in the annual general meeting.
208
 
If minority shareholders would refrain from voting on the delisting, their influence in 
the general meeting would be decreased. At the same time the votes of the majority 
shareholder would in practice account for a larger share of the votes than he should be 
able to cast. This would further diminished the protection the requirement of the general 
meeting’s approval, passed with a two-tier majority, offers minority shareholders. 
 
Yet, the studies mentioned above only analysed the participation for ordinary annual 
general meetings. Hence the question whether these observations on the participation of 
minority shareholders at the annual ordinary general meeting can be applied to the 
extraordinary general meeting during a delisting as well poses itself.  
 
There are several factors that speak in favour of such an applicability. First of all, some 
of the arguments mentioned above, for example the feeling on the side of minority 
shareholders that they lack the weight to influence the outcome of the general meeting, 
are applicable to the extraordinary general meeting as well. This is especially true in 
light of the assumption that selling of their shares might be preferable to minority 
shareholders compared to actively getting involved in the decision-making process.
209
 
 
With the announcement of the intention to delist towards the shareholders, i.e. the 
calling of the extraordinary general meeting, minority shareholders might hastily decide 
to sell their shares without waiting for the resolution of the general meeting on the 
matter. In this case they would not expect to remain shareholders for much longer, and 
therefore would not expect the outcome of the general meeting to affect them. 
Therefore, this may make their participation in the general meeting less likely. Notably, 
an averagely informed private investor is unlikely to be familiar with these questions, 
and may even be inclined to sell his shares as a reaction to a decrease in stock prices, 
fearing a further devaluation. Therefore, this assumption does not stand in contradiction 
to the findings regarding the possibility of a decrease in share prices immediately after 
the delisting-announcement.  
 
On the other hand, the extraordinary general meeting, called in order to decide whether 
or not to delist the company, has a fundamentally different significance than an annual 
ordinary general meeting. Under LR 5.2.5 para. 1 lit. b the issuer is obligated to issue a 
circular to all shareholders, in which as per LR 13.3.1 para. 1 both a clear explanation of 
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the cause of the circular, as well as of the assorted risk and benefits has to be given. 
Hence at least in theory the shareholders should be aware of the significance of this 
particular general meeting, which should translate into a higher rate of participation. 
 
Moreover, due to the requirement of a two-tier majority the influence of minority 
shareholders is boosted in this matter. This could lessen the likelihood that minority 
shareholders asses their participation in the general meeting as pointless. 
 
Additionally, through Directive (EU) 2017/828
210
 a number of steps were taken to 
strengthen the shareholder’s rights and facilitating exercising these rights. 
Namely in Art. 3c of said directive intermediaries, such as banks, holding stocks on 
behalf of their customers, were required to enable shareholders to exercise their rights 
through a third person. 
Beyond that under Art. 8 para. 1 Directive 2007/36/EC
211
, implemented through 
Section 360A subsec. 1 Companies Act 2006, shareholders may participate in, and 
exercise their rights during, general meetings electronically. As this significantly 
reduces the cost and effort required from shareholders to cast their votes it encourages 
their participation.
212
 
 
Therefore, the applicability of the observations regarding the participation of private 
shareholders made on ordinary general meetings on the extraordinary situation of a 
delisting-related general meeting seems questionable. 
 
Nonetheless, even if, thanks to the information provided under LR 13.3.1 para. 1 and 
the recent steps taken by the European legislator to facilitate the exercise of 
shareholder’s rights, minority shareholders participate at a higher rate than usual, it 
remains likely, that not all shares owned by minority shareholders are voted on. 
 
On the other hand, the majority shareholder is likely to back the delisting and commit 
all votes he has available.
213
 
 
Therefore, the first tier of the two-tier majority, the requirement of the approval of at 
least 75 percent of all votes, only represents a relatively low hurdle. As a result, the 
protection of minority shareholders largely hinges on the second tier, the necessity of 
the approval of the majority of the votes cast by independent shareholders. 
 
4.3.2.1.4 Potential gaps in the protection awarded: 
 
Nonetheless and beyond these considerations, the approach to protect minority 
shareholders by requiring their approval to delisting faces a grave and inherent systemic 
problem.  
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Through the requirement of the general meeting’s approval, issued by a two-tier 
majority, minority shareholders are not so much protected from the consequences of the 
delisting as they are enabled to prevent the delisting taking place. 
 
Minority shareholders intend to invest in a certain stock hoping to sell this stock at a 
later point with a profit.
214
 Compared to this primary financial interest the interest in the 
membership rights, that owning the stock conveys, is secondary for them. Minority 
shareholders are typically not interested in exercising control, nor do they have a 
strategic vision for the company. As such their bond to a certain company is weak, and 
in general during delisting their interests are best served if they sell their shares and 
reinvest in another company.
215
 
 
Therefore, protecting their interests in their membership at the expense of their financial 
interests would be misguided. 
This means that the requirement of the general meetings approval, issued by a two-tier 
majority, in itself does not ideally accommodate the interests of minority shareholders. 
 
Even if they succeed in preventing a delisting, they will remain tied to a company 
whose majority shareholder has fundamentally different goals than they have. Should 
the majority shareholder choose not to abandon his plans after failing to attain the 
general meetings approval under LR 5.2.5 para. 2 the reasonable course of action for the 
majority shareholder would be to seek to create conditions, in which the minority 
shareholders are likely to leave the company. To achieve this goal, he could take a 
number of steps exerting his controlling influence on the company, ranging from 
reducing dividends or using his large number of shares to push down the stock price to 
strengthening his majority trough an increase of the company’s capital. In any event, 
after successfully fending off a delisting attempt the minority shareholders will find 
themselves in conflict with the controlling shareholder. This is an undesirable outcome 
for them in general, and one that, given their primarily financial interests, would be 
avoidable. 
 
As a result, the membership rights of minority shareholders are protected trough the 
requirement of the general meetings approval, while their financial interests are given 
insufficient consideration. 
 
Yet, as the delisting can only take place if the majority of the votes cast by independent 
shareholders are in favour, the parties pursuing a delisting are forced to convince at least 
a significant part of the minority shareholders of their undertaking. 
 
Through LR 5.2.5 para. 2 no. 1 the minority shareholders are given a de-facto veto, 
elevating them into a position of power. Where the two-tier majority required by LR 
5.2.5 para. 2 no. 1 works as intended, the balance of power between the majority 
shareholder and the minority shareholder should be levelled. From this position of 
power, minority shareholders should in theory be able to defend their interests and 
extract concessions from the parties pursuing the delisting. Whether or not a buy-out 
offer is made, a grace period set or any other consideration is given to minority 
shareholders’ interests is up entirely to the parties. 
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In theory through the flexibility it grants the British law offers a very elegant solution, 
as it reduces the legislator’s involvement to a minimum and grants the parties far 
reaching freedom to defend, further and balance their own interests as they see fit. 
 
In this regard the British approach depends on the minority shareholders practically 
utilizing the power their involvement under LR 5.2.5 para. 2 no. 1 grants them. While in 
theory they are put in a position where they can stop the delisting, in practice their 
ability to utilize their position to protect and further their interests is questionable. 
 
Minority shareholders in general do not pursue strategic goals besides their own 
financial gain.
216
 This gain materializes itself through an increase in the share’s prices 
over time, which does not require any active participation of the shareholder. As a 
result, minority shareholders usually are unaccustomed to shareholder activism and lack 
formal or informal networks that would facilitate coordinated action. 
 
As they are likely to be unfamiliar with such coordinated action they will struggle to 
coordinate their voting power on the spot. A notable exception to this are professional 
investors such as hegdefonds who might be more experienced and able to excert 
influence trough shareholder activism. 
 
Without coordination between all minority shareholders however the majority 
shareholder is free to accommodate only those shareholders whose votes he needs, 
leaving the others to fend for themselves. As minority shareholders each pursue their 
individual financial gain they have no incentive to resist such attempts of dividing them 
by the majority shareholder. 
 
As a result, should a company for example have a majority shareholder of 60 percent, 
two large minority shareholders of 11 percent each and a larger number of small-time 
investors accounting for the remaining 18 percent, were the majority shareholder able to 
strike a deal with the large minority shareholders, under British law the small-time 
investors were deprived of all protection. 
 
The likelihood of such a scenario is increased by the fact that while some professional 
investors like fonds might be obliged only to invest in listed companies others, 
particularly those with a high tolerance for risks like hegdefonds, might be open to the 
prospect of a delisting as the potential for value creation is higher in less tightly 
controlled unlisted firms.
217
 The situation is further aggravated by the fact that these 
professional minority shareholders will regularly be more likely to actively seek out a 
deal with the majority shareholder and the company, while smaller private minority 
shareholders will be more likely to remain passive, further increasing the odds of an 
outcome in which they are passed over. 
 
This is especially problematic as these inexperienced small-time private investors are 
also the group of investors which is least capable of protecting its own interests and 
therefore most dependent on protection by the legislator. 
 
4.3.2.1.5 The protection awarded in relation to the restrictions imposed: 
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Additionally, the requirement of the general meetings approval, issued by a two-tier 
majority, leads to another problem regarding the protection granted to the interests of 
minority shareholders and the restrictions that are correspondingly placed on the 
company and the majority shareholder. 
 
In this context the requirement of an approving resolution by the general meeting, 
passed with a two-tier majority, in itself constitutes a barrier. As the majority 
shareholder is forced to gain the support of at least half of all independent shareholder 
the usual balance of power is turned upside down. Some minority shareholders are 
rendered expandable by the two-tier majority prescribed by LR 5.2.5 para. 2 no. 2, 
while others are elevated into a position of far outsized importance. Should in the 
above-mentioned example only one large minority shareholder exist instead of two the 
entire delisting process would de-facto be decided on by him alone. As he only holds a 
22 percent share this gives him an undeserved and unjustified influence which he might 
utilize to extort disproportionate concessions from the majority shareholder and the 
company. 
 
4.3.2.2 Circular: 
 
The circular stipulated by LR 5.2.5 para. 1 ensures that shareholders are adequately 
informed, especially with regards to the reasons, potential benefits and potential risks of 
the delisting. As only a sufficiently informed shareholder will be able to understand the 
question posed to him and wheigh the risks and benefits this is crucial for the 
requirement of the general meetings approval to be able to function. Additionally, as 
mentioned above, the information provided by the circular may boost the tournout of 
minority shareholders, further supporting the effectiveness of the requirement of the 
general meeting’s aproval in protecting their interests. Therefore the circular is less of 
an individual instrument and more of a complement to the requirement of the general 
meetings approval, aimed at ensuring its effectiveness.  
 
4.3.2.3 Grace period: 
 
A very interesting aspect of the British law is the additional stipulation of a 20-day 
grace period in LR 5.2.5 para. 1 no. 3. The idea of a grace period is that shareholders are 
able to sell of their shares as long as they are still listed, and can thus avoid being locked 
in or suffering financial losses. As shareholders regularly struggle to find a buyer for 
them soon to be delisted shares other than the majority shareholder this instrument has 
in practice proven to be ineffective.
218
 This general malady is amplified by the short 
timeframe of just 20 days. As a result, if this grace period is supposed to grant 
dissenting shareholders a way out, it is insufficient. 
 
Another aspect under which the grace period may be viewed is the possibility of the 
influx of new shareholders after the general meeting’s resolution. A shareholder who 
has acquired his shares after the general meetings approval would be subject to the 
effects of the delisting without the usually mandated involvement. While in general it 
can be argued, that he has freely subjected himself to this situation by voluntarily 
acquiring the shares, in the immediate period after the resolution there might by a lack 
of available information on the resolution. In these cases, the 20-day grace period 
ensures the necessary dissemination of the relevant information.  
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4.3.2.4 Exceptions: 
 
One area where this freedom granted by British law could be universally beneficial are 
those cases where there is an objective need for delisting, for example to avoid 
bankruptcy. Here the minority shareholders should be ready to agree to the undertaking 
without seeking to extract a compromise, hence without the need for lengthy 
negotiations. Under German law even in those cases a buy-out offer would be required, 
delaying the delisting and imposing significant costs. 
 
Yet, especially here the practical flaws of the British law become apparent. Should 
minority shareholders abuse their de-facto veto right or should lengthy negotiations 
ensure between the parties, the survival of the company would be threatened. 
 
The British legislator himself seems to have reckoned the limitations of his approach in 
exempting such cases from the requirement of the general meetings approval in 
LR 5.2.7. 
 
In light of the special circumstances, and the fact that in such circumstances not only the 
interests of the company itself and its shareholders, but also the company’s creditors 
interests have to be considered, an exception for restructuring measures is a reasonable 
choice. Yet, the execution chosen by the British legislator is questionable. 
 
The first problem arises out of the fact that in order to be exempted from the 
requirement of the general meetings approval under LR 5.2.7 the issuer is obliged to 
notify an RIS, not the FCA. If he however notifies an RIS of the circumstances of his 
delisting he will attract substantial attention to them, the avoidance of which is likely to 
be one of the motives of his delisting. Additionally, under LR 5.2.7 para. 3 no. 2 he 
needs to explain why the continued listing would jeopardize a proposal necessary to 
ensure his survival. However, if the issuer is in such a dire situation, that his immediate 
survival is threatened attracting additional attention to this situation and revealing the 
details and possible risks to the future restructuring proposal might be 
counterproductive.
219
 
 
4.3.2.5 Judicial review: 
 
While there are no special procedures specifically intended to protect minority 
shareholders, due to the clarity and relative simplicity of the British law the options for 
recourse open to minority shareholders have to be considered adequate. 
4.4 Conclusion: 
While in theory the framework constructed by the British regulator contains some 
interesting aspects, in light of the considerations detailed above, questions regarding its 
effectiveness at protecting minority shareholders remain. 
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It could be argued, that these potential gaps in the protection which it affords in practice 
are a necessary downside of the freedom granted to the parties. This reasoning neglects 
that under British law, as laid out above, only those shareholders who actively exercise 
their freedom are granted protection. Therefore, if not all shareholders are equally 
capable of utilizing the freedom the British law grants them, the protection awarded by 
British law has to be qualified as insufficient. This is especially true as the gaps in 
protection do not necessarily result in a less restrictive regulation from the point of view 
of the company and the majority shareholder. 
 
On the other hand, the British law constitutes a very clear regulation, that sets out easily 
determinable preconditions and gives no room to disputes, thereby providing a high 
degree of legal certainty. The non-existence of court rulings and literature on the matter 
in the UK speaks to this fact. 
 
 
 
5 CHAPTER FIVE: COMPARISON 
Compared side by side, the German and British legislators have developed very 
different solutions to the problem. Given these differences, the question of how the 
regulations they opted for compare to each other and how effective they are at 
protecting minority shareholders, especially in relation to the restrictions they impose on 
the issuer and the majority shareholder, poses itself. 
5.1 Comparison of the main instruments used: 
The most obvious difference between the regulatory system in Germany and in the UK 
derives from the approach taken towards the problem. The German legislator viewed 
the problem from the perspective of capital market law and consequently choose a buy-
out offer as the main means to protect minority shareholders’ interests. The British 
legislator instead opted to employ company law to this regard, requiring the general 
meetings approval. 
5.1.1 Protection under capital market law or under company law: 
The different structure of British company law does render the dogmatic arguments 
brought against a solution trough company law in German literature at least partially 
invalid. 
 
Nonetheless, the British law still faces the problem that  the primary interest of minority 
shareholders is financial in nature,
220
 while their interest in the membership rights the 
ownership of a certain share conveys is much lower. Of course, minority shareholders 
do not form a monolithic bloc, and some minority shareholders, especially professional 
ones, might indeed pursue strategic aims, and therefore might be interested in having 
their membership rights protected. Yet, these shareholders are more of an exception,
221
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and crucially are far better positioned to protect their interests trough shareholder 
activism than the average minority shareholder. 
 
Hence, as minority shareholders pursue financial aims and value their share more as a 
stock, than for the membership rights it conveys, capital market law is both closer to the 
problem, and therefore concurrently better able to offer an effective remedy. 
 
That is not to say that a solution trough company law is inherently incapable of 
providing the necessary protection to minority shareholders’ interests. However, as 
these interests are financial in nature they are likely only protected as a side effect to the 
protection of minority shareholders’ membership rights. 
5.1.2 The instruments in detail: 
The approach taken by the British legislator, can be characterized as the attempt to 
offset the usual power divide between the minority shareholders and the majority 
shareholder.
222
 In theory this creates a situation where the minority shareholders are 
involved in the decision-making process, enabling them to protect their own interests.  
 
The German law on the other hand sets out very detailed preconditions for the delisting, 
which leave little to no room for the parties involved to negotiate their own solution. 
Instead of demanding sufficient approval at the level of the general meeting, thus 
ensuring the involvement of minority shareholders in the decision-making process, the 
German legislator has chosen to require a buy-out offer in 
§ 39 para. 2 sentence 3 No. 1 BörsG. 
 
With that minority shareholders are denied any say in the decision-making progress and 
are instead only protected through financial compensation. The aspects of this 
compensation, namely the price offered in the buy-out offer, are determined according 
to the law, irrespective of the parties’ wishes. Compared to the British approach this 
represents a much more static solution. As minority shareholders have no say in the 
decision, their only remedy for an offer they deem insufficient is refusing said offer or 
take the matter to court. This means they would potentially suffer a decrease in value as 
well as lose their trading platform and find themselves stuck with their stocks. Given the 
financial nature of their interests, such a cause of action is likely unappealing to them. 
Therefore, this constitutes an undesirable outcome. Notably in those cases where the 
company is undervalued, the German approach will not provide adequate 
compensation.
223
 
 
In these cases, under British law minority shareholders would be able to leverage the 
influence, that the necessity of the two-tier majority approval under LR 5.2.5 para. 2 
lit. b gives them, to force the majority shareholder or the company to consider such an 
excess value in a potential offer. However, there are a number of concerns regarding 
their practical ability to do so,
224
 especially if minority shareholders are viewed not 
individually but as a group. 
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Another aspect to be considered is that the German legislator does not view delisting as 
a structural measure.
225
 Therefore, a compensation for the entire value of the share is not 
intended. While this approach may be criticized as to narrow,
226
 given their economic 
goals and the relationship towards the company whose shares they hold, which is more 
that of an investor than a shareholder in the sense of a member, this is not entirely 
unjustified. 
 
Notably, due to the practical constraints the British approach faces, it still offers a much 
higher level of protection. In particular, the challenges faced by the British approach 
relate to its ability to grant any form of protection to the financial interests of minority 
shareholders.
227
 On the other hand, the challenges facing the German approach only 
relate to the question of whether an excess value of the membership against the stock is 
sufficiently considered, not against the ability of the German approach to protect the 
financial interests of minority shareholders in general.  
 
One group of minority shareholders for which the freedom granted by British law may 
be preferable to the strict regulation adopted by the German legislator could be 
institutional investors. Where these are bound by their own terms and conditions to only 
invest in listed companies they might value the ability to influence the decision process, 
and avert the delisting altogether, higher, than the compensation offered under German 
law. 
The same is likely to be true for those investors who pursue long-term strategic goals 
and are willing and capable to take high risks, for example hegdefonds. Nevertheless, it 
should be taken in to account that these groups are exceptions, and neither their interests 
nor their capabilities are an accurate representation of the average minority shareholder. 
 
As a result, if the protection offered by each approach is considered in theory, the 
German approach offers a higher level of protection, notably avoiding similar gaps like 
those that British law suffers from. Additionally, the protection offered by German law 
is much better tailored to those areas that are of primary importance to most minority 
shareholders, i.e. their economic interests and their characteristics, namely their usually 
passive nature and lack of experience with shareholder activism. 
 
5.1.2.1 The protection awarded in relation to the restrictions imposed: 
 
Even so the interests of minority shareholders do not exist independently, but are 
connected to, and in conflict with, the interests of the company and the majority 
shareholder. Therefore, the cost that the protection afforded to minority shareholders 
imports on the company and the majority shareholder should be considered as well. 
 
From their point of view the necessity of a buy-out offer under § 39 para. 2 no. 1 BörsG 
can, especially if a notable number of shares is held by minority shareholders, result in 
said buy-out offer requiring significant funds. This could constitute a significant 
obstacle. In extreme cases, where neither the majority shareholder nor the company is 
able to finance a buy-out offer, this hurdle could even be insurmountable.
228
 Compared 
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to that, obtaining an approving resolution of the general meetings, as demanded in 
LR 5.2.5 para. 2,para could represent much less of an obstacle. 
 
Still, in this regard two additional aspects besides the costs themselves need to be 
considered. 
 
First, as far as the buy-out offer is considered, these costs also result in the acquisition 
of additional shares. As these shares are bought at market prices there is no financial 
loss for the offeree. This is especially true, if the fact that the company and the majority 
shareholder will pursue a delisting if they see a long-term financial benefit by cutting 
the costs associated with the listing is considered.
229
 
 
Second, while the costs associated with obtaining an approving resolution of the general 
meetings, passed with a two-tier majority, as demanded by LR 5.2.5 para. 2 may be 
lower in general, in those cases where a single minority shareholder holds a de-facto 
veto they could still be significant. Besides the financial expenditure, the British 
solution could also prove to be time consuming, as in addition to carrying out the 
general meeting the company or the majority shareholder would have to secure the 
necessary majority, which could require complex and lengthy negotiations. 
 
 
 
 
Compared to that the German law offers a relatively fast process.
230
 
 
Furthermore, the costs of a delisting under British law are impossible to accurately 
calculate upfront, as the demands of minority shareholders and the difficulties of 
securing the necessary majorities will usually not be accurately predictable. 
 
As the costs of a delisting under German law are overwhelmingly attached to the buy-
out offer they can be determined beforehand either from the publicly known stock price 
or, where § 39 para. 3 BörsG makes an exception and instead relays on the company’s 
actual value, from that value, which is likely known to the issuer and the majority 
shareholder.  
 
A second aspect closely related to the costs is the predictability of the outcome under 
each approach. Only where the results are reasonably foreseeable potential costs and 
benefits of such an undertaking can be weighed, and unnecessary costs through stillborn 
attempts can be avoided. Therefore, from the point of view of the issuer or the majority 
shareholder the predictability of the likelihood that an attempt to delist the company is 
extremely important.  
 
Under British law the success of a delisting depends on the votes of the other 
shareholders, be it because there is no controlling shareholder or because a two-tier 
majority is required. However, the way the votes will be cast at the general meeting will 
be almost impossible to predict, especially if there is a large number of uncoordinated 
small-scale shareholders. On the other hand, while German law lays out detailed 
conditions to be met, the key condition, the buy-out offer is tied to the stock’s price over 
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the last six months, making not only the potential costs but also the possibility of an 
unsuccessful attempt much more predictable. 
 
5.1.2.2 Preliminary conclusion: 
 
In light of these considerations the German approach in theory offers much more 
complete and better fitting protection. While it imposes higher costs on the parties 
pursuing the delisting from their point of view it may also be preferential as these costs 
are not necessarily equal to a financial loss and are beyond that predictable. Compared 
to that under British law the costs might be lower overall, yet neither they nor the 
probability of success can be accurately predicted. 
 
Therefore, in terms of the protection offered to minority shareholders and their interests, 
especially if that protection is put in relation to the restrictions it imposes on majority 
shareholders, the buy-out offer as implemented by the German legislator seems to be the 
preferable option.  
 
5.1.2.3 The Situation in light of economic realities: 
 
In German literature the general idea of protecting minority shareholders through 
mandating the general meetings approval has been discussed and criticized widely.
231
 
The aforemade arguments and considerations to some extent reflect this critique. 
However, where such criticism is brought forward in German literature the economic 
realities are rarely explicitly considered.  
 
Most likely however, most German authors instinctively take the average shareholder 
structure in Germany as the basis for their considerations. 
Should the average British shareholder structure diverge from that basis these critisms 
would need to be reconsidered and might possibly even be rendered inaccurate. 
 
Therefore, a final assessment needs to consider the possibility that there are differences 
in the average shareholder structure between Germany and the UK, which could affect 
the ability of the instruments chosen by each legislator to protect the interests of 
minority shareholders.  
 
5.1.2.4 Possible differences: 
 
A possible difference in the typical shareholder structure could be the number of shares 
that are free-floating. Free-floating shares in general refers to those shares that are not 
held by a controlling shareholder. While there is no uniform definition of when that is 
the case, free-floating is commonly assumed, where the shareholder holding the share 
holds 5 percent or less of all shares.
232
 Some authors observe that compared to 
continental Europe the shareholder composition of companies in the Anglo-American 
sphere is characterized by a greater number of free-floating shares.
233
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Yet, from the observation of such a divide between continental Europe and the Anglo-
American sphere it cannot be derived with the necessary certainty that such a divide 
exists as well specifically between Germany and the UK. 
 
There are however a number of indications that such a divide exists between Germany 
and the UK, as well. For example, studies conducted in 1999 and 2001 found that 90 
percent of all companies listed on the London Stock exchange did not have a major 
shareholder holding a share of 25 or more percent,
234
 while 85 percent of all listed 
German companies where found to have such a shareholder.
235
 Additionally at the stage 
of the Initial Public Offering major shareholders of German companies where found to 
hold 76 percent of shares compared to just 63 percent for British companies.
236
 
 
Furthermore, the British law itself hints at a different structure of shareholders in the 
UK. Under LR 5.2.1 the FCA may cancel a listing of securities if there are special 
circumstances that prevent normal trade in them. According to LR 5.2.2 para. 2 such 
special circumstances exist when the percentage of shares in public hands, i.e. in free-
float, falls below 25 percent. The fact that a free-float of less than 25 percent is seen as 
an extraordinary circumstance justifying the cancellation of the listing against the 
issuers will speaks to the prevalence of free-floating shares in the UK. 
 
In Germany on the other hand, the presence of a majority shareholder is, at least during 
delistings, to be expected.
237
 
 
Lastly, a study conducted between 2003 and 2011 of 3577 German and 6629 British 
companies found the average percentage of shares in free-float, i.e. held by a 
shareholder holding 5 percent or less of all shares, to be 63,1 percent in Germany 
compared to 79,4 percent in the UK.
238
 
 
Therefore, the existence of a divergence in the shareholder’s structure, i.e. a higher 
number of free-floating shares in British listed companies compared to German listed 
companies can safely be assumed.  
 
5.1.2.5 Consequences:  
 
This poses the question how this divergence between the average shareholder 
composition in German and British companies affects the assessment of the approach 
chosen by the British legislator. Unlike the German approach, the British approach is 
connected to the company’s shareholder’s composition. Therefore, the higher number of 
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free-floating shares in British companies could affect the protection it offers minority 
shareholders. 
 
At first glance a free-float of 79,4 percent may be taken as an indication that the 
presence of majority shareholder is more of an outlier than the norm. 
 
In cases where there is no majority shareholder the impulse to undertake a delisting 
would likely come from the company’s managers. Here the conflict of interests laid out 
in Chapter One and with it the question of the protection of minority shareholders in this 
form does not present itself. 
 
Still, in interpreting these numbers two factors need to be considered: 
 
First, larger companies exhibit a much higher average of free-floating shares, for 
example the average share of free-floating shares of companies listed in the DAX, as of 
the 31.12.2013, stood at 81 percent and therefore significantly higher than the 63,1 
percent observed for the larger sample during previous studies.
239
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the share of free-floating shares did not increase significantly in subsequent years, 
standing at 82 percent in 2017,
240
 respectively 84 percent in 2018,
241
 this divergence 
cannot be attributed to a sudden increase in the share of free-floating stocks. This in turn 
means that smaller and medium sized companies will exhibit a somewhat lower share of 
free-floating shares. 
 
Second, delisting benefits the majority shareholder to a much greater extent than the 
minority shareholders,
242
 hence companies with a majority shareholder will be more 
likely to pursue a delisting on the initiative of said majority shareholder. Additionally, 
as under British law a two-tier majority is required, companies where due to the 
presence of a majority shareholder attaining these majorities will be easier, will again be 
more likely to undertake a delisting. 
 
Therefore, the numbers mentioned above cannot be taken as an indication that the 
presence of a majority shareholder is an improbable assumption, particularly with 
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regards to delistings. However, they do indicate that a majority shareholder wielding a 
supermajority of more than 75 percent is a relatively rare occurrence. 
 
5.1.2.5.1 Influence on the first tier: 
 
Where this is the case, the first tier, the majority of 75 percent of all votes, can indeed 
work as a barrier and force the majority shareholder to win over at least some of the 
minority shareholders. 
 
5.1.2.5.2 Influence on the second tier: 
 
Furthermore, if only shares held by shareholders holding no more than 5 percent of all 
shares are counted as free-floating, the likelihood that a second large minority 
shareholder besides the majority shareholder exists decreases as well. 
This assumption is evidenced by the fact that for two thirds of the 200 largest British 
listed companies no shareholder holding a share larger than ten percent is present,
243
 
while on average the five largest shareholders hold an average combined share of 
between 25 and 30 percent of all shares.
244
 
 
This may be the most influential change, as it deprives the majority shareholder of the 
possibility of cooperating with just one or two minority shareholders while ignoring the 
remainder. Instead, the majority shareholders will, at least in most cases, find himself in 
a position where he is forced to construct a broad coalition with other shareholders to 
attain the necessary majorities at the general meeting and reach his goal. 
The same is true for the second tier. If the majority shareholder cannot rely on only one 
or two larger minority shareholders, as in the examples provided above, he is forced to 
rely on a broad coalition of minority shareholders instead. As a result, it would become 
much harder and costlier for him to accommodate only the particular interests of the 
members of this coalition. Faced with such high costs, and the difficulty of assembling a 
larger coalition, he would likely result to attempt to bring as many minority 
shareholders on board as possible by accommodating the interests of minority 
shareholders in general. 
 
5.1.2.5.3 Effectiveness in the average case: 
 
Thus, where the composition of shareholders does not deviate from the average the 
criticism of the British solution laid out above would in practice not be relevant. In these 
cases, the British solution could fully develop its strengths, namely the freedom it gives 
to the parties and its flexibility. 
 
Where a clear benefit for delisting is given, for example where further capitalization is 
no longer needed, and the company suffers from the costs associated with the listing, the 
majority shareholder should find it easy to convince minority shareholders of his plans. 
Here a delisting could be carried out quickly and, especially compared to the German 
buy-out offer, cheaply. Where the situation is not that clear the majority shareholder 
will have to convince minority shareholders to support him, either by bringing forward 
convincing arguments or by incentivizing them, for example by promising to increasing 
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future dividends. Notably, one possibility for the majority shareholder to attain a 
sufficient majority would be to make a buy-out offer. 
 
As a result, at least for those companies where shares are distributed relatively equally 
between shareholders, which as laid out above can be assumed for the average British 
listed company, the requirement of a two-tier majority should provide adequate 
protection for minority shareholders, while offering the benefit of being much more 
flexible and adaptive than the buy-out offer implemented by the German legislator. 
 
5.1.2.5.4 Effectiveness in non-average cases: 
 
However, the higher average percentage of free-floating shares observed for British 
companies is only an average number. 
 
Even if it implies that situations, where in addition to a majority shareholder, one or two 
large minority shareholders are present might be less likely it by no means can be 
interpreted as rendering such constellations entirely improbable. 
 
The British law therefore has to be seen as a trade-off: it offers flexibility and 
adaptability for most cases, while in those cases where the shareholder’s composition 
diverges from the average it only offers incomplete protection and may fail entirely.
245
 
 
The German approach on the other hand offers a steady level of protection, which 
comes at the cost of a very inflexible regulation, that offers almost no consideration to 
the individual circumstances. 
 
5.1.2.6 Comparison in light of these considerations: 
 
Consequentially, the question that poses itself is whether the advantages the British 
approach offers are able to outweigh or at least counterbalance its drawbacks. 
 
From the point of view of the majority shareholder the mandatory buy-out offer under 
German law means that any delisting entails significant costs. Therefore, unless a large 
minority shareholder holds a de-facto veto, like in the examples provided in Chapter 
Four, and can thus extort an undue compensation for his votes, from his point of view 
this might well be the case. 
 
For the minority shareholder however, the situation is different. As the overwhelming 
majority of minority shareholders pursues purely financial goals, for which they are 
dependent on the stock market as a trading platform, a buy-out offer, that compensates 
them for the value of their stocks, will be a well-fitting remedy. 
 
While there may be some minority shareholders, particularly those with experience on 
the stock market and a high tolerance for risks, that could benefit from the freedom the 
British law offers, for most minority shareholders, as they pursue the single uniform aim 
of generating a profit through their investment, the flexibility and adaptability of British 
law will be of little benefit. 
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Additionally, as it is up to the shareholder whether he accepts the buy-out offer under 
§ 39 BörsG, those who have no interest in leaving the company, for example because 
they believe that the share’s value exceeds the price offered for their stocks, are able to 
remain, while for all others a relatively convenient exit is secured. 
 
As for the lack of flexibility, this drawback is most relevant where the company is no 
longer capable of sustaining the costs of the listing and the majority shareholder is 
unable to finance a buy-out offer. However, these cases could also be dealt with through 
an exception.  
5.1.3 Conclusion:  
In conclusion, although the British solution, the requirement of the general meetings 
approval passed with a two-tier majority, might deliver a satisfactory result in most 
cases, in the remaining cases it suffers from substantial gaps in the protection it offers. 
At the same time, it is questionable whether the advantages of the British solution 
justify this drawback. Compared to that the much more detailed and less flexible 
German law ensures the protection of the interests of minority shareholders at a steady 
level. Hence even with the divergences in the average shareholder composition between 
Germany and the UK considered, under the aspect of minority shareholders’ protection, 
the German approach remains preferential. 
5.2 Comparison of the practical application:  
The main drawback of the German solution is a lack of flexibility. However, this 
drawback might be balanced out in the law’s practical application. This practical 
application differs substantially between Germany and the UK. While in the UK the 
procedure is carried out centralized through the FCA, in Germany the procedure is 
carried out through the individual stock markets administrations.  
 
In the UK the FCA centrally maintains the official list, while each stock market 
individually maintains the admission to trade.
246
 In Germany the individual stock 
markets administration holds the competence for both the listing and the admission to 
trade. Considering this, the divergence in competence is more of a necessary 
consequence of the listings structure, than a conscious decision by the respective 
legislators. 
 
However, the divergence in the practical procedure is amplified by the FCAs strict 
fixation in its decision, which stands in contrast to the discretionary power the German 
legislator has granted the stock exchanges administrations in their decision.  
 
In theory through the decentralization of the competence under German law and this 
discretionary power the individual stock exchanges could be put in competition to each 
other, which might motivate them to extend the protection they grant to investors in 
order to attract investors.
247
 
 
Upon closer inspection this possibility seems less likely. First, investors, especially 
smaller ones, which are especially dependent on protection, are unlikely to consider the 
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rules regarding delistings in their choice of stock markets. They will instead look to the 
traditional quality indicators of stock markets, namely transaction costs and 
accessibility.
248
 Companies considering an Initial Public Offering on the other hand are 
far more likely to calculate the long-term consequences of such a transaction, among 
them the conditions of a future delisting.
249
 As a result, stock markets might indeed end 
up in competition to each other, however not in terms of raising the level of protection 
to attract investors, but in lowering the level of protection in order to attract Initial 
Public Offerings.  
 
While delistings would be relatively rare occurrences at all but the largest stock 
markets, not justifying employing dedicated personnel, a central authority handling all 
delistings could collect both expertise and experience on the matter, decreasing the 
likelihood for errors in the application of the law and therefore increasing legal 
certainty. Therefore, referring all delistings to a single centralized authority is 
preferable. Under these aspects the German legislator has decided to transfer the check 
of the buy-out offer to the BaFin.
250
 
 
Besides removing the central instrument of § 39 BörsG from the stock markets 
administrations competence, the German legislator has constructed a very detailed 
regulation, which leaves little room for the stock markets administrations to exercise 
their discretionary power. The notable exception being their ability under 
§ 39 para. 5 sentence 2 BörsG to determine the date on which the delisting takes effect. 
 
Therefore, the lack of flexibility from which the German solution suffers is not 
remedied in the practical application of the German law. 
 
Hence, especially if the very different structure of the listing in Germany and in the UK 
is considered, there are surprising parallels in both German and British law in regards to 
the competence for overseeing the delisting process. 
 
These parallels are likely due to the need to ensure a uniform and predictable 
application of the law, as well as to prevent a competition between stock markets, which 
could harm the protection investors are granted in practice. 
5.3 Comparison of the exceptions: 
Another aspect related to the ability of each approach to accommodate extraordinary 
circumstances are the exceptions built into each law. 
5.3.1 The transfer of the listing to a foreign stock market: 
Under § 39 para. 2 no. 2 BörsG the buy-out offer is not required if the stock will 
continue to be traded on a domestic stock market or a stock market in the EEA and if 
equal requirements exists on that market. 
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In light of the trend of the continuing harmonization of capital market law in Europe the 
level of protection awarded to shareholders is likely to be similar on these markets,
251
 
which, especially under the aspect of the single unified European market, renders this 
exception a sensible, if through the demand of an equal requirement currently 
practically irrelevant option. 
 
Yet simply removing this requirement cannot be the solution, as this would open the 
doors for evasive manoeuvres, eroding the protection granted to minority shareholders. 
Notably British law contained a similar exception in LR 5.2.6,
252
 although without the 
requirement for equal protection, which was abolished in 2010. 
5.3.2 Restructuring measures: 
Even though theoretically the flexibility of the British law should allow for a quick and 
easy answer to cases where restructuring measures necessitate delisting the British 
legislator has decided to include a special exception from the necessity of the general 
meetings approval in such cases in LR 5.2.7.  
 
Especially in these cases the costs associated with the mandatory buy-out offer under 
§ 39 BörsG are especially problematic, as in such a situation the majority shareholder 
might be hesitant to invest his capital in additional shares, while the company itself 
lacks the funds needed for the buy-out offer. Notably, in these cases the success of the 
delisting is in the interest of the minority shareholders as well. Nonetheless under 
German law even in those cases a buy-out offer would be required, delaying or possibly 
even preventing the delisting altogether. This may represent one of the most serious 
downsides of the German law when compared to the British law. This downside is 
especially concerning due to the fact that restructuring measures are one of the reasons 
for delisting.
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5.4 Comparison of the timeframe: 
Interestingly both legislators have included some form of restriction regarding the time 
of entry into force of the delisting. 
 
Under LR 5.2.5 para. 1 lit. b the delisting may not take effect within two weeks after the 
passing of the general meeting’s resolution. As outlined above this ensures that the 
information is disseminated on the market before the delisting takes effect. Asides from 
that the date is determined by the issuer himself. 
 
Under German law on the other hand the date is determined by the relevant stock 
exchanges administration and may be up to two years in the future. This provides an 
added layer of protection as it allows the stock markets administration to enable 
shareholders to adjust to the imminent delisting where such adjustments are necessary 
due to the circumstances. 
5.5 Comparison of the possibilities for judicial review: 
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 See Chapter Three. 
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 LR 5.2.6, as enacted on 06.08.2007 
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 Pfüller and Anders, supra note 12, p. 462. 
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While German law envisages a special procedure for judicial review British law does 
not. Nonetheless, as the British regulation is far clearer and provides no point so 
prepositioned to dispute like the price of the buy-out offer, this cannot be taken as an 
indication that there is a lack of protection in this regard under British law. 
5.6 Conclusion: 
The British law, while it offers more freedom to the parties, and is more readily able to 
adapt to extraordinary circumstances, such as an excess of the share’s value over the 
stock price or restructuring measures, suffers from gaps in the protection it offers. While 
the significance of these gaps is reduced when the average shareholder structure in the 
UK is considered, they are not fully eliminated. The German law, while much stricter 
and less flexible, offers a continuous level of protection in all situations, and therefore 
represents the preferable option, at least as far as the protection of minority shareholders 
is concerned. 
 
As the German law, while offering a greater degree of predictability, results in higher 
costs, from the perspective of the majority shareholder and the issuer the preference is 
less clear, and will depend on the individual situation. Still, in this regard the higher 
protection awarded to the minority shareholders by German law does not result in 
prohibitive restrictions on the issuer and the majority shareholder. 
 
An additional increase in the divergence of the level of protection of minority 
shareholders’ interests granted by each law results from the, albeit small, discretionary 
power the administrations of German stock exchanges wield. 
 
A notable shortcoming of the German law reveals itself when the exceptions are 
compared. While British law has recognized the special needs arising out of 
restructuring measures the German legislator, whose solution is especially ill fitted to 
these situations, has failed to do so. 
 
 
Therefore, in conclusion, when compared, the British laws flexibility renders it a more 
versatile solution, which however only functions properly, where the shareholder’s 
composition is close to or equal to the British average. On the other hand, the German 
law offers a higher, and crucially better fitting, protection for minority shareholders.  
CONCLUSION:  
In summary, the main reason for delisting from the point of view of the issuer are the 
significant expenditures related to maintaining the listing, notably stemming from duties 
to report and disclose information. For the majority shareholder, as he bears the brunt of 
these costs, while not benefiting from the listing as much as minority shareholders, 
these motives are true as well. In addition, for him the possibility to strengthen his 
control of the company, and a possible undervaluation of the stocks on the market 
compared to their real value may also be relevant motives. From the point of view of the 
minority shareholder, although there may be situations where there is a common interest 
of all shareholders in delisting, such as for the purpose of allowing restructuring 
measures, the risks will usually outweigh the benefits. While the indications for a loss of 
value due to the delisting-announcement are less clear, the main concern here will be 
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the loss of the main trading platform. This loss directly impacts the ability of minority 
shareholders to reach their primary goal, to generate a profit through their investment. 
Therefore, delisting threatens to frustrate the entire reasoning of the minority 
shareholder’s presence on the stock market. 
 
Hence delisting represents a conflict of interests between the issuer and the majority 
shareholder and the minority shareholder on the other side. 
 
Notably, the subsequent question, to what degree minority shareholders can and must be 
protected has not been regulated by the European Union and remains therefore for the 
individual national legislator to decide. While regulations governing delistings 
theoretically touch upon Art. 63 para. 1 TFEU, as possible restriction would be justified 
due the need for minority shareholder’s protection, this does not result in practical 
boundaries for the national legislator. 
 
The German legislator has chosen to protect minority shareholders by mandating a 
buy-out offer be made prior to the delisting. The buy-out offer, as implemented in § 39 
BörsG, offers a fitting remedy for minority shareholders, as it perfectly accommodates 
the economic nature of their interests. Yet, from the point of view of the issuer and the 
majority shareholder it causes significant costs and may not always be feasible, 
especially when the company is threatened by bankruptcy. 
 
The requirement of the general-meetings approval, chosen by the British legislator to 
protect minority shareholders, on the other hand focuses more on minority shareholders’ 
membership rights and only offers protection for his economic interests as a reflex. 
Additionally, there are some indications that minority shareholders are less likely to 
participate in general meetings, further drawing into question the effectiveness of the 
British approach. However, as there so far has been no research considering the special 
circumstances of delisting, a final assessment of this argument would require additional 
research. Notably in some constellations a significant number of minority shareholders 
might be cast aside and left unable to influence the decision-making process. 
 
When both solutions are compared with regards to the protection they offer minority 
shareholders the flaws of the British approach become even clearer. It does offer the 
parties more freedom, and therefore is better able to adapt to the individual 
circumstances, especially in cases involving an undervaluation of the stocks by the 
market or restructuring measures. Yet, as minority shareholders in general pursue a 
single and uniform goal, to generate a profit from their investment these advantages will 
regularly be of little interest to most of them. Although the German approach lacks the 
flexibility and adaptability of the British approach, it avoids the gaps in the protection 
from which the British approach suffers. As it offers a higher, and notably steady, 
degree of protection it is preferable under the aspect of the protection of minority 
shareholders. Even when the costs it imparts on the issuer and the majority shareholder 
are considered this this conclusion stands, as these costs are justified.  If besides these 
theoretical legal arguments, the factual situation on each market, i.e. the average 
composition of shareholders of listed firms, is considered, these imbalances in the 
protection offered to minority shareholders is somewhat less pressing. In this regard a 
substantial divergence exists, with a much higher degree of flee-floating shares in the 
UK. As a result, the criticism of the British approach is somewhat blunted, as due to the 
higher level of free-floating shares the problems arising out of the de-facto veto a large 
minority shareholder would hold are less likely to become practically relevant. 
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Therefore, British approach in practice will likely deliver satisfactory results in most 
cases. 
 
Another aspect, that becomes clear during the comparison of the German and British 
law is the lack of an exception from the buy-out offer for restructuring measures in 
German law, which is especially troubling given the high costs and low flexibility that 
characterize the German law from the issuers and the majority shareholders point of 
view. Nonetheless, as even when the factual circumstances and their divergence 
between Germany and the UK are considered, situations where the British approach 
awards only insufficient protection remain, although less likely, still possible, the 
German solution still presents itself as preferable under the aspect of minority 
shareholders’ protection. 
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